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This dissertation research is a study of subjectivity. That is, the purpose of this dissertation 
research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current 
practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary 
collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this purpose, I first conduct literature 
review on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, both in the United States and in other 
countries. Then, I conduct literature review on regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs). 
The literature review is followed by a historical review of South Korea’s local autonomy and 
regionalism, and a systemic analysis of the current South Korean literature on regional governance. 
Based on the comprehensive review of the extant literature, I propose that the RIGO framework is 
exportable beyond the United States boundaries and I use the South Korean case to test this. Then, 
I provide a description of the methodology used in this study to conduct research and analysis: I 
first present research questions and hypotheses; describe how the concourse and the Q-set of this 
study are created as well as how the study participants are selected, and Q-sort administered; 
describe how the data analysis is conducted; and provide a list of the Q statements used for the 
study. I then report the findings: there are five factor groups, which are agenda-broadening, 
agenda-narrowing, membership-expanding, equality-promoting, and local-government-centric. I 
present an interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and Nelles’ identification of RIGOs 
and also discuss consensus and disagreement that exist among the factor groups identified. Then, 
v 
I evaluate the hypotheses of this research in relation to the factors elicited. Furthermore, based on 
the factor profiles, I evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences 
among South Korean local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the 
current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South 
Korea. Lastly, I conclude the research with a summary of the findings, the research implications, 
both theoretical and practical, and some limitations of this research and recommendations for 
future research agenda.  
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This dissertation research is a study of subjectivity. That is, the purpose of this dissertation 
research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive the current 
practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary 
collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this purpose, I employ Q 
methodology to investigate those officials’ patterns of attitude toward regional intergovernmental 
organizations (RIGOs), one of the key channels, if not the dominant, through which multi-lateral 
cross-boundary collaboration among local governments is implemented, enforced, and promoted. 
In the first and second section of this introductory chapter, I address the problem studied in this 
research and briefly discuss the research rationale. The first two sections are followed by the 
section that discusses policy and theoretical significance of this research and highlights the 
contribution this study intends to make to the extant regional governance1 literature. In the last 
section of the chapter, I outline the structure of this dissertation. 
 
1 Although there are some conceptual similarities between governance and regional governance (e.g. involving actors 
across different tiers of hierarchy and sectors, stressing importance of both formal and informal rules as well as the 
role of self-regulation, and so forth), regional governance refers to a certain geographical scale whereas governance 
does not (Jordan, 2008; Willi et al., 2018). Furthermore, Wallis (1994a: 21)’s working distinction between regional 
governance and regional government is helpful in understanding how the two concepts differ: whereas regional 
government refers to actual political units, regional governance addresses the “collective capacity to assess needs and 
opportunities, and to mobilize resources in response to them.” Some scholars theorize that regional governance is an 
effective alternative to regional government (although such theories lack empirical support) (Whisman, 2013). For the 
definitional understanding of regional governance, by resorting to numerous scholars (e.g. Orfield, 1997; Parks and 
2 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The aim of this research is to investigate South Korean local government officials’ patterns 
of attitude toward multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments and 
viewpoints on RIGOs in terms of RIGOs’ current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues 
for development. RIGOs, belonging to a larger class of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations,2 are voluntary associations of which general-purpose local governments make up 
the majority of the membership and serve as channels through which various members (including 
but not limited to those local governments) communicate, coordinate, and collaborate on multiple 
policy domains that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations are of significant academic interest and widespread practical importance since 
people now live in a complex, multi-boundary world (Miller and Nelles, 2020) and all tiers of 
government pursue innovative responses to citizens’ service demands (e.g. Grigsby, 1996; Visser, 
2004; Whisman, 2013; Wolf and Bryan, 2009). Although cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations are of academic and practical importance, yet they remain largely overlooked and 
underexplored in the regional governance literature (Barbour, 2019; Bryan and Wolf, 2010; Miller 
et al., 2019; Wolf and Bryan, 2009). According to Rickabaugh (2018a), there exist only a small 
number of studies conducted in the United States investigating cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations from a wider geographic scope and they are now at least two decades old (e.g. Dodge, 
 
Oakerson, 2000; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Stephens and Wilkstrom, 2000; Wallis, 1994a; Whisman, 2013; Willi et 
al., 2018), I broadly define regional governance as collaborative arrangements between local governments without a 
structural consolidation. 
2 Both cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations and RIGOs are defined in detail in chapter two. 
3 
1996; Mogulof, 1971; Wikstrom, 1977), whereas much of the more recent work is heavily case-
study-driven and narrow in terms of geographic scope (e.g. Kwon and Park, 2014; Luna, 2015; 
Visser, 2004). Whisman (2013) also notes that most extant studies are descriptive and case-study-
driven and she cites Wood (2006), Vogel and Nezelkewicz (2002), and Gordon (2007) as some 
examples of such cases. Thus, we likely have a limited (and also outdated) understanding of cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations (of which RIGOs are one class), “lacking underlying 
conceptual structure and empirical breadth” (Rickabaugh, 2018a: 1). Furthermore, to the best of 
my knowledge, there are only a handful of studies on how stakeholders (especially insider experts) 
thought to be relevant to the conduct of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations view their 
organizations as well as multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments that 
they take part in implementing, enforcing, and promoting.34 
As for the main theoretical approach to better understanding regional governance in this 
dissertation study, I rely on Miller and Nelles (2020)’ identification and classification of regional 
organizations of which RIGOs are one class. I propose that Miller and Nelles’ theoretical 
 
3 According to Whisman (2013), Bowman and Franke (1984)’s 1981 survey of regional council executive directors of 
the United States is the only perceptual study conducted in this field. To the best of my knowledge, as of the time of 
writing, Bowman and Franke (1984), LeRoux et al., (2010), LeRoux and Pandey (2011), Whisman (2013), and 
Zeemering (2016; 2019) are the only scholars who have conducted perceptual study on regional governance 
stakeholders in the United States. The first four investigations mentioned above are surveys on city managers whereas 
Zeemering is primarily interested in elected officials’ role in and perceptions of regional governance. 
4 Such a lack of literature devoted to understanding perceptions of public officials engaged in intergovernmental 
relations is surprising especially given that, as Anderson (1960) argues, “strictly speaking, there are no 
intergovernmental relations, there are only relationships among officials who govern in their official and unofficial 
capacities” (see also Choi and Wright, 2004; Wright, 1988). 
4 
framework is a useful tool for empirical analyses of regional governance not only in the United 
States but also in different social, political, economic, and cultural settings outside of the United 
States.5 Particularly, their theoretical framework is useful to better understand how stakeholders 
(especially insider experts) who are relevant to the conduct of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations perceive multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration. Regardless of national 
differences, there exists a fair degree of practical consensus reached on what attributes that cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations share in common, and that is one of the reasons why 
Miller and Nelles’ theoretical framework can be applicable to different geographies of the world 
although it is primarily based on the analysis of the United States case. 
To better understand how multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local 
governments is perceived by the key stakeholders especially in terms of RIGOs’ current practice, 
future prospects, and potential avenues for development, this research explores patterns of South 
Korean local government officials’ attitudes and viewpoints toward RIGOs, examine factors 
contributing to the shaping of the patterns identified, and discuss their perceptual and attitudinal 
differences and similarities. 6  In so doing, I utilize Q methodology, which is a methodology 
 
5  Why their theoretical framework is a useful tool especially in conducting comparative research on regional 
governance is explained in detail in chapter two. 
6 Exploratory factor analysis is an “orderly simplification of interrelated measures” used to explore “the possible 
underlying factor structure of a set observed variables without imposing a preconceived structure on the outcome” 
whereas confirmatory factor analysis is “a statistical technique used to verify the factor structure of a set of observed 
variables” to “test the hypothesis that a relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent constructs 
exists” (Suhr, n. d.; see also Child, 1990). As for the latter, the researcher “uses knowledge of the theory, empirical 
research, or both, postulates the relationship pattern a priori and then tests the hypothesis statistically” (Suhr, n. d.). 
As far as perceptual studies are concerned, the lack of our understanding of RIGOs (as well as the lack of existing 
5 
increasingly gaining popularity among not only public administration but also political science 
and urban studies scholars in their systematic survey of perceptions (e.g. Durose et al., 2016 in 
public administration; Zechmeister, 2006 in political science; Raynor et al., 2018 in urban studies). 
The surveys for this research were developed by taking into consideration of five properties Miller 
and Nelles (2020) identify that RIGOs have in common: membership (primarily of local 
governments but not necessarily limited to); agenda (encompassing a considerable number of 
policy domains); legitimacy (as viewed and to certain extent bestowed by state (or local) 
government and/or federal (or national) government and its agencies); ambition (or articulation of 
its representational scope); and scale (of its geographic and representational superimposition). In 
this study, these properties are deemed useful in generating statements for the empirical analysis 
of South Korean local government officials’ patterns of attitude toward multi-lateral cross-
boundary collaboration and viewpoints on RIGOs. Once those patterns and viewpoints are 
obtained using Q methodology, I examine potential (background) factors contributing to the 
shaping of the revealed patterns and discuss perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences 
that exist among those officials. 
 
 
empirical evidence and/or previous perceptual research) does not permit generation of theoretically rigorous a priori 
hypotheses and subsequent confirmatory factor analysis to test whether the data fit a hypothesized model. As such, I 
conduct exploratory factor analysis (i.e. Q methodology) to identify perceptual (and attitudinal) factors and to 




People worldwide in the contemporary world no longer live in a simple, single-boundary 
world but a complex, multi-boundary world (Miller and Nelles, 2020). As such, public service 
providers are increasingly committed “to confront (ing) spillovers and to leverag (ing) the benefits 
of social agglomeration” through the means of regional collaborative governance designed and 
implemented to “address problems that are bigger than any one local government” (Miller and 
Nelles, 2020: 326). Despite the importance of the topic, however, little academic work has been 
done on it beyond the United States, especially in the context of systematically documenting the 
existence of RIGOs and analyzing the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for 
development of them. This lacuna provides an opportunity for this dissertation study to contribute 
to understanding regional governance through the lens of RIGO framework especially in a non-
US setting by testing the framework’s exportability beyond the United States boundaries. 
What is the current state of our collective knowledge about the ways in which local 
governments transcend their borders to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate with their 
neighbors especially through the channel referred to as RIGOs by Miller and Nelles? As identified 
by Miller and Nelles, there are 477 RIGOs in the United States (as of 2018). In the meanwhile, as 
of 2019, using the South Korean Ministry of the Interior and Safety’s statistics, I have identified 
that there are 28 RIGOs in South Korea.7 In the United States, there were almost no RIGOs in 
1920 but, by 1970, RIGOs rose as the primary channel through which local governments connect 
to each other in policy and administrative problem-solving. In South Korea, RIGOs are more of a 
recent phenomenon since an absolute majority of RIGOs came into existence per the Local 
 
7 How I have identified RIGOs in South Korea is explained in detail in chapter three. 
7 
Autonomy Act enacted in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, administrative consultative councils 
(many of which are South Korean RIGOs) merit analysis since there exists a rapidly growing 
population of them (as of the time of writing, at least 220) commanding significant budgetary and 
personnel resources to promote multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration in collective problem-
solving. Such a regionalist approach to policy and administrative problem-solving bears greater 
importance in the South Korean context since, as shall be discussed in depth in chapter three, the 
country’s city-county consolidation attempts have been largely unsuccessful. However, despite the 
prevalence of RIGOs in the United States and the recent proliferation of them in South Korea, 
studies on them are yet scarce, and thus there is a need to attain a systematic understanding of what 
they are, what they do, and what they aspire to be.  
Miller and Nelles’ theoretical framework constructed based on the findings of the United 
States case enables us to make an extension of the research on RIGOs outside of the United States 
boundaries in a systematic manner. They identify that there are five properties of RIGOs that help 
us not only define what RIGOs are, but also analyze them with a high degree of concept 
operationalizability and measurability. Especially, given that ICA dilemmas are ubiquitous 
(Tavares and Feiock, 2018) and as the trend of decentralization likely leading to “beef (ing) up 
regional and especially local government” (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 132), or “plac (ing) local 
authorities back in the saddle” (Lefèvre, 1998), is now global (Rondinelli, 1981; Sellers and 
Lidström, 2007; Tavares and Feiock, 2018) and will likely continue, regional governance systems 
such as RIGOs that facilitate multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration are receiving more 
systematic attention than before.8 This dissertation research aims to add to the growing body of 
 
8 Multi-level governance, a concept that shares many conceptual commonalities with regional governance, emerges 
“as the combined result of decentralization, the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, a shift from an interventionist towards an 
8 
knowledge on regional governance systems in the era of decentralization (followed by institutional 
changes and reshufflings in most country cases) by examining patterns of South Korean local 
government officials’ attitudes and viewpoints toward RIGOs in terms of RIGO’s current practice, 
future prospects, and potential avenues for development, examining factors contributing to the 
shaping of the patterns identified, and discussing their perceptual and attitudinal differences and 
similarities. To achieve this aim, I use Q methodology as the primary analytical technique and base 
my research on Miller and Nelles’ theoretical framework especially in developing a set of 
statements that I administer to South Korean local government officials.  
1.3 Policy and Theoretical Significance 
Governments at all tiers (i.e. local, provincial, and national in the South Korean case; local, 
state, and federal in the United States case) spend substantial amounts of resources in designing 
and implementing institutions and policies aimed at promoting communication, collaboration, and 
coordination across all levels of the hierarchy. However, substantial resources are lost due to 
fragmented authority and thus there arise institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas9 whereby 
 
‘enabling state,’ budgetary cutbacks and a growing degree of institutional self-assertion and professionalism at the 
subnational level” (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 134). Thus, since the above factors influencing the emergence of multi-
level governance are getting increasingly intensified across the world, multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration and 
the organizations that host such collaboration merit further analysis. 
9 ICA dilemmas can be understood as a set of dilemmas arising when there is fragmentation of political authority 
leading to two or more local governments in a region or metropolitan area “to make individual decisions that lead to 
9 
the lack of integrative and collaborative efforts leads to inevitable spillovers and/or loss of scale 
economies (Feiock, 2009 and 2013; Feiock and Scholz, 2009; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). As 
RIGOs serve as a basis of “social agglomeration” (Miller et al., 2019: 2) to overcome such issues 
of externalities (Downs, 1994) that cross jurisdictional boundaries, it is critical to advance our 
knowledge and understanding of the ways in which RIGOs reduce the negative impacts of division 
or partitioning of authority and how they strengthen the organizational capacity “to confront 
spillovers and to leverage the benefits of social agglomeration” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 2). These 
issues are gaining more importance as the numbers of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations that can be labeled as RIGOs are continuously on the rise in a global scale.10 
Moreover, it is important for not only academicians but also policymakers and practitioners 
to better understand the dynamics of perceptions RIGO stakeholders (especially government 
officials working for them) hold on their organizations in terms of what RIGOs are, what they do, 
and what they aspire to be. Such an enhanced understanding would enable the academicians, 
policymakers, and practitioners to help upgrade the institutional design of RIGOs and improve 
organizational practice that would produce enhanced performance in multi-lateral cross-boundary 
collaboration. 
In summation, this research aims to fill in the gaps of our understanding of  RIGOs with 
respect to different perceptual and attitudinal aspects underlying how South Korean local 
government officials working for RIGOs perceive their organizations in terms of RIGOs’ current 
 
inferior collective outcomes than would be obtained if they acted together” (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 299; see also 
Feiock, 2013). 
10 As to which non-US cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be labeled as RIGOs is discussed in detail 
in chapter two. 
10 
practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development and, by doing so, it will yield 
knowledge and insights that policymakers and practitioners can leverage on when they strive to 
solve policy and administrative problems broadly referred to as ICA dilemmas. 
1.4 Overview of Chapters 
This dissertation is presented in six chapters. For the purpose of provision of a basic 
understanding of this dissertation research, the first chapter describes an issue to be addressed, 
establishes a rationale for the research, and underscores the policy and theoretical significance this 
research intends to demonstrate. 
In the second chapter, I conduct a literature review on cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations, both in the United States and in other democracies (primarily Western). There are 
two sections in this chapter, including a broad review of the extant literature on cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations and an in-depth review of the emergent literature on RIGOs on 
which this dissertation primarily draws to develop a set of Q statements. 
Chapter three provides an overview of RIGOs of South Korea. The first section of this 
chapter presents a historical account of how legally mandated local government networks came 
into existence. The second section is a systematic review of the current status of those networks 
illustrating their organizational profiles (e.g. geographical location, constituent members, year of 
establishment, and types of public services provided). In the same section, I also distinguish 
networks that are RIGO-qualifiers from networks that do not qualify. In the last section of this 
chapter, I test whether the RIGO framework is exportable beyond the United States boundaries 
using the South Korean case. 
11 
 Chapter four, in which there are three sections, provides a description of the methodology 
used in this dissertation to conduct research and analysis. The first section of this chapter presents 
research questions and hypotheses, and the following section two provides details of the research 
design. That is, section two describes how the concourse and the Q-set of this study are created as 
well as how the study participants are selected, and Q-sort administered. I also provide a 
description of how the data analysis is conducted. The third section of this chapter introduces the 
selection of statements employed for the actual empirical survey and analysis. 
 Chapter five contains five sections. The first section reports the analysis results and the 
factors derived from the results and provides a description of the factor profiles constructed from 
the data. In the second section, I present an interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and 
Nelles’ identification of RIGOs. Section three reveals and discusses consensus and disagreement 
that exist among the factor groups identified. Section four evaluates the hypotheses of this research 
in relation to the factors elicited.  In the following section five, based on the factor profiles, I 
evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences among South Korean 
local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the current practice, future 
prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South Korea. 
 In chapter six, which is comprised of four sections, I conclude the research with a summary 
of the findings and the implications of my research, both theoretical and practical. I also discuss 
some limitations of my research and recommendations for future research agenda. 
12 
2.0 Literature Review 
For the purpose of providing a theoretical background for this study, this chapter surveys 
the current literature on regional governance. More specifically, I first examine cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations and then RIGOs, which constitute a part of a larger group of 
cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. In so doing, this chapter reviews major 
theoretical approaches utilized in studying regional governance in public administration, political 
science, and urban studies. 
In the first section of this chapter, I first briefly introduce and organize various forms of 
regional governance into a hierarchy of increasing difficulty. Then I introduce some competing 
views on various forms of regional governance. In the following subsections, I first examine cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations’ defining attributes and activities as well as their 
historical change and evolution. I then review the non-US literature on regional governance. 
Lastly, some theoretical limitations are discussed in the last subsection of the first section. The 
second section of this chapter takes a closer look at the newly emergent literature on RIGOs. 
Conducting in-depth review of the RIGO literature enables me to provide a thick description of 
five distinct properties that RIGOs have. The five properties serve as benchmarks in the course of 
constructing the Q statements to be used for empirical assessment in this research. 
13 
2.1 Extant Literature on Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations 
In this section, I conduct review on the extant literature on cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations. But before doing so, as informed by the extant literature, I first 
briefly introduce and organize various forms of regional governance into a hierarchy of increasing 
difficulty. I then outline long-standing, ongoing debate and controversy around some competing 
views on the merits and demerits of various forms of regional governance (in particular 
consolidation versus fragmentation debate). 
 Scholars of regional governance has insisted for many years that governmental 
fragmentation as well as metropolitan fragmentation and suburban autonomy are the major sources 
of US urban problems (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 854). Some consequences of such 
fragmentations, as summarized by Mitchell-Weaver and his colleagues (2000: 854-855) are “racial 
imbalance in the metropolis”; “income and resource imbalance in the metropolis”; “the protection 
of privilege”; “increased business power”; “the impact of suburbs on central cities (i.e. the 
exploitation hypothesis)”; “problems of housing affordability and homelessness”; “the lack of 
rational land use planning and commitment to environmental values”; and “problems in service 
(as) citizens deny the advantages of economies of scale.” In response to such emerging urban 
problems of the United States, as early as in the 1960s, Gulick (1962), perhaps better known for 
the acronym POSDCORB representing the functions of the chief executive, calls for the need to 
replace a “focus on the core city of metropolitan areas” with “a broader view of socioeconomic 
and governmental development across the metropolis”; bring “all levels of US government – 
especially the states –  on emerging urban problems”; and consider “some form of metropolitan 
‘federalism’” as an “appropriate intergovernmental approach” (as quoted in Mitchell-Weaver et 
al., 2000: 854). However, as to what intergovernmental approach (whether it takes a form of 
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federalism or not) is appropriate remains a matter of scholarly (as well as practical) debate.11 
Therefore, understanding what intergovernmental approaches are available and viable would be a 
good starting point from which to start discussions. 
 To the best of my knowledge, scholars thus far have identified as many as seventeen types 
of approaches to intergovernmental coordination (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 864; Walker, 1987: 
16) for regional governance and practitioners have likewise (Alliance for Regional Stewardship, 
1987, as quoted in Parr et al., 200612). The below Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate both the scholars 
and practitioners’ understanding of the seventeen types of intergovernmental coordination options, 
in which the options are presented along a spectrum from those requiring the least structural change 
(and thus the easiest to implement and least debatable) to those requiring the most structural change 
(and thus the most difficult to implement and most controversial) (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: 
864; Parr et al., 2006; Walker, 1987: 16). All of the seventeen intergovernmental coordination 
choices are potential institutional responses to some prominent urban development trends (that 
affect suburban and rural areas) especially in the United States like continued governmental 
fragmentation, increased metropolitan diversity, significant cuts in federal and state aid to local 
governments, and a continued increase in the number of metropolitan areas and their populations 
(Walker, 1987; Weitz and Seltzer, 1998). The below two tables are helpful in understanding the 
 
11 In a similar vein, as noted by numerous scholars, although it would be ideal to match the scale of public goods 
provision with the scale of the goods themselves, as to what the “correct” size of government is remains an ongoing 
debate (e.g. Chakraborty, 2010; Parks and Oakerson, 2000; Whisman, 2013). 
12 According to Parr and his colleagues (2006), the seventeen options are identified by Walker (1987) and the Alliance 
for Regional Stewardship has later modified Walker’s study by developing two additional options for professional 
use. 
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ongoing debate and controversy around some competing views on the merits and demerits of 
various forms of intergovernmental coordination, regional governance, and even regional 
government. 
 




Type of intergovernmental coordination option 
Relatively 
easy 
 1. Informal cooperation 
2. Interlocal service contracts (or interlocal service agreements) 
3. Joint powers agreements 
4. Extraterritorial powers 
5. Regional councils / Councils of Governments (COGs) 
6. Federally encouraged single-purpose districts 
7. State Planning and Development Districts (SPDDs) 
8. Contracting (from private vendors) 
Moderately 
difficult 
 9. Local special districts 
10. Transfer of functions 
11. Annexation 
12. Regional special districts and authorities 
13. Metropolitan multi-purpose district 
14. Reformed urban county 
Very 
difficult 
 15. One-tier consolidations: city-wide and area-wide 
consolidations 
16. Two-tier restructuring: federal structures 
17. Three-tier reforms: metropolitan-wide structures 
Sources: Adopted from Mitchell-Weaver et al. (2000: 864); Paiva (2003: 43); Walker (1987: 16) 
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Type of intergovernmental coordination option 
Easier 
options 
 1. Informal cooperation 
2. Interlocal service contracts 
3. Joint powers agreements 
4. Extraterritorial powers 
5. Councils of governments 
6. Federally encouraged single-purpose regional bodies 
7. State planning and development districts 
8. Contracting 
9. Regional purchasing agreements 
Harder 
options 
 10. Local special districts 
11. Transfer of functions 
12. Annexation 
13. Special districts and authorities 
14. Metro multipurpose districts 
15. Reformed urban county 
16. Regional asset districts 
17. Merger/consolidation 
Source: Adopted from Alliance for Regional Stewardship (as cited in Parr et al., 2006) 
 
 To the best of my knowledge, the most recent theoretical update on the above classification 
is Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303 and 313)’s illustration of policy instruments and mechanism for 
integrating ICA dilemmas as presented in the below Figure 1. Their framework defines two 
dimensions of intermunicipal cooperation: the type of urban integration mechanism (the horizontal 
axis on Figure 1) and the degree of institutional scope (the vertical axis on Figure 1). In their 
framework, on the x-axis lie integration mechanisms in the order of increasing autonomy costs 
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(and thus difficulty) 13 : network embeddedness, contracts, delegated authority, and imposed 
authority. On the y-axis lie the level of complexity of solutions to ICA dilemmas in the order of 
increasing decision-making costs, ranging from narrow-scope (e.g. single purpose or bilateral 
intergovernmental cooperation) to complex, large-scope intergovernmental cooperation. 14 
Transaction costs can be understood in terms of the two axes represented in Figure 1, which are 
differences in autonomy costs and decision costs. According to Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303), 
among various kinds of integration mechanisms, local government officials initially seek 
mechanisms that best produce the collective benefit with the lowest decision costs and the greatest 
extent of autonomy, but due to a number of constraints,15 participating local government sacrifice 
 
13 Autonomy costs refer to the degree to which local governments sacrifice their local autonomy because any kind of 
cooperative arrangement involves local governments’ “hollowing out” their power and legitimacy (Tavares and 
Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Holum, 2016 and Jacobsen, 2015). Thus, the more formalized integration mechanisms are, 
the more significant transfers of powers (i.e. the higher autonomy costs) from the participating local governments to 
the inter-governmental agreements. 
14 Decision-making costs refer to both the costs associated with designing and negotiating an inter-governmental 
agreement “capable of overcoming collective action problems” especially in terms of the number of actors (Tavares 
and Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Olson, 1965 and Provan and Kenis, 2008) and the costs associated with “managing 
task diversity and complexity” (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 303; see also Holmström and Milgrom, 1991 and Tadelis, 
2002). According to Feiock (2013), when the number of local governments and the number of tasks involved increase, 
complexity increases. 
15 Tavares and Feiock (2018) name a country’s constitutional-legal framework (as well as its history, culture, and 
traditions), heterogeneity within a local jurisdiction and between local jurisdictions, the scope of pre-existing 
integration arrangements, and the degree to which local government officials disagree on goals (especially on the 
allocation of benefits and costs) as potential constraints. 
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decision costs and some extent of autonomy. Figure 2 is their real-world application of the 
theoretical framework using European country cases. 
 
 
Figure 1. Integration Mechanisms and Transaction Costs 




Figure 2. Policy Instruments for Integrating ICA Dilemmas in European Countries 
Source: Adopted from Tavares and Feiock (2018: 313) 
 
As to the ongoing debate and controversy around some competing views on the merits and 
demerits of various forms of regional governance, tension between the advocates for decentralized 
versus consolidated systems of government is most visible (Frisken and Norris, 2001; Jimenez and 
Hendrick, 2010; Kim and Jurey, 2013). According to Dolan (1990), at the time of his writing, the 
issue of local government fragmentation versus (metropolitan) consolidation is more than fifty 
years old (see also Weitz and Seltzer, 1998).16 The former, who can be broadly referred to as poly-
centrists or the public choice school (e.g. Foster, 1993; Kim and Jurey, 2013; Lefèvre, 1998; 
Nelson and Foster, 1999), stress the importance of leveraging local autonomy and inter-
jurisdictional competition under decentralized governance systems to promote public welfare. 
Their rationale is that, when there are a large number of governments, they would be under 
competition with others and this competition to accommodate their residents’ preferences (so as 
 
16 Some even argue that the debate has raged since the 19th century (e.g. Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010). 
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to retain those residents and even attract more) would generate greater efficiency (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980; Ostrom et al., 1961; Tiebout, 1956).1718 On the contrary, the latter (i.e. the 
advocates of consolidation), often labeled as the American reformers (Lefèvre, 1998), argue that 
a political and administrative fragmentation into a large number of local governments is less 
conducive to achieving improved public welfare as such a disaggregation causes a lack of 
economies of scale (and also economies of scope) along with a lack of inter-governmental 
cooperation. 19  Their rationale is that more consolidated systems of government are more 
advantageous in promoting public welfare as they can achieve greater regulatory consistency and 
administrative efficiency through more strategic, coherent policy making and implementation. The 
extreme notion of consolidation can be referred to as centrist whereas the more moderate notion 
can be referred to as regionalist (e.g. Foster, 1993; Kim and Jurey, 2013; Nelson and Foster, 1999). 
 Making value judgment on which systems of government (i.e. decentralized versus 
consolidated) are better is not the purpose of this dissertation study. Rather, the purpose of 
 
17 According to Lefèvre (1998), the American reformers have been criticized by the public choice school on the 
grounds that the so-called (consolidated) ‘metropolitan model’ does not necessarily favor either a reduction in 
production costs or innovation; furthermore, it does not allow a free choice of localization to citizens (Tiebout, 1956). 
The public choice school instead favors “poly-centric political systems,” which are more competent in providing 
public goods and services and mitigating potential externalities in so doing (Ostrom et al., 1961). 
18 Especially, Ostrom and her colleagues (1961: 837) caution that metropolitan, large, and centralized governments 
can be “insensitive and clumsy in meeting the demands of local citizens for public goods.” 
19 Furthermore, Lyons and Lowery (1989), as quoted in Weitz and Seltzer (1998), argue that their empirical research 
findings “run contrary” to “several tenets of the public choice model: citizens living in fragmented areas are not better 
informed about tax and service packages, are not more likely to participate in local affairs, and are not more satisfied 
with their local government services than are their counterparts who live in consolidated government areas.” 
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providing the above contrasting account of the trichotomy (or dichotomy in a reductionist’s view) 
is to situate cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations within the context of a broader 
theoretical debate about various forms of regional governance as such a debate “on how regions 
should be governed” is “bigger than the presence or absence of regional cross-boundary 
organizations” of which RIGOs are one type (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 339). In short, theoretically, 
cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations can be understood as a regionalist choice among 
many (e.g. on inter-jurisdictional cooperation, see Bollens, 1993; on metropolitan governance, see 
Feiock, 2004; Lefevre, 1998) to address the problem of political, administrative, and policy 
fragmentation. 
In the following subsections, I conduct brief review on the extant literature on cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations in terms of their conceptual and operational 
foundations as well as their rationale and basis of existence. I also conduct review on the non-US 
and non-Korean literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations as well as some 
caveats of them informed by the literature. In so doing, I deliberately use the term ‘cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations’ instead of rather vague terms like regional governance or 
regional organizations although there are “other types of private and nonprofit institutions engaged 
in the work commonly associated with local governments” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340) because, 
in alignment with Miller and Nelles (2020) and Agranoff (2014), I take a government-centric 
approach to understanding multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration out of a belief that local 
governments “still represent a powerful organizing structure around which civil society functions” 
(Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340). 
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2.1.1 Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations’ Attributes and Activities 
In today’s world, almost all local governments in America belong to at least one regional 
organization of local governments that represents the region and promotes its members’ collective 
interests and addresses “problems that are bigger than any one local government” (Miller and 
Nelles, 2020: 326). 20  Such organizations can be broadly labeled as cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations, and they provide a variety of services to their member 
jurisdictions, some of them directly targeted to solving interlocal problems, ranging from joint 
purchase programs to interlocal cooperative agreements between local governments (Leland and 
Whisman, 2012; Whisman, 2013). Perhaps the best starting point for any understanding of cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations especially in the American context would be the 1962 
report published by the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR) titled A Commission Report: Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in 
Metropolitan Areas. In the report, the ACIR calls for the creation of an organization in each region 
that would “seek a better understanding among the governments and officials in the area, to 
develop a consensus regarding metropolitan needs, and to promote coordinated action in solving 
their problems” (United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1962, p. 34) 
and identifies that there are ten potential strategies that would be intended to encourage better 
 
20 Furthermore on why cooperation among local governments is forged, or motivations for creating cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations, scholars point out to cost-efficiency (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002), economies of 
scale and scope (e.g. Boyne, 1992; 1995), the presence of a policy entrepreneur (Cigler, 1999), fiscal stress (both real 
and perceived) (Olberding, 2002a), changing fiscal conditions and thus fiscal pressure (Kwon and Feiock, 2010; 
LeRoux and Carr, 2007), trust between local governments (Feiock, 2005; Tavares and Feiock, 2018; Thurmaier and 
Wood, 2002), and administrative (rather than political) leadership at local level (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991). 
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regional governance, of which voluntary metropolitan councils are one strategic choice.2122 To 
date, cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, of which voluntary metropolitan councils 
are the most extensively used and thus the predominant strategic choice taken in the United States, 
have been understood as “a specific type of interlocal activity to be compared with other types of 
interlocal activity” (Rickabaugh, 2018a: 132; see also Foster and Barnes, 2012; Feiock, 2009; 
Tavares and Feiock, 2018) as recommended by the ACIR or on the spectrum of intergovernmental 
coordination options as listed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Some national-level professional associations, of which cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations are their constituent members, refined the technical definition of 
their member organizations based on the members’ shared characteristics. For instance, the 
National Association of Regional Council characterizes its members as “a multi-service entity with 
state- and locally-defined boundaries that delivers a variety of federal, state, and local programs 
while carrying out its function as a planning organization, technical assistance provider, and 
“visionary” to its member local governments” (National Association of Regional Councils, 2020). 
Another example is the National Association of Development Organizations’ characterization of 
its members: “multi-jurisdictional regional planning and development organizations … (that are) 
 
21  The ten potential strategies are the use of extraterritorial powers, intergovernmental agreements, voluntary 
metropolitan councils, urban county, transfer of functions to the state government, metropolitan special districts 
(limited purpose and multipurpose), annexation and consolidation, city-county separation, city-county consolidation, 
and federation (in the order of appearance in the report). 
22 However, according to Miller and his colleagues (2018: 17)’ retrospective review of the extent to which the ten 
strategies have been used in practice since the publication of the report, only voluntary metropolitan councils are 
extensively used as a strategy that “engage (s) all of the principle governmental jurisdictions within the region to either 
deliver shared services or attempt to address the common issues facing the region as a whole.” 
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public-based entities play (ing) an invaluable role in fostering intergovernmental collaboration 
among federal, state and local officials … deliver (ing) and manag (ing) various federal and state 
programs … work (ing) to solve areawide issues and to address the fundamental building blocks 
required for competitive and sustainable communities and economies” (National Association of 
Development Organizations, 2020). 
In the meanwhile, scholars “taking new looks at” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336) cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations have reached some level of consensus about the 
defining attributes of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in practice, especially in the 
United States. For instance, Visser (2004: 51-52) views regional councils of voluntarily 
participating local governments that prefer “the use of interorganizational collaboration rather than 
hierarchical regional government” in resolving area-wide public problems a “possible mechanism” 
through which the aims of planning for “area-wide land use, public infrastructure, and the delivery 
of regional public services” can be achieved, thereby promoting “the equitable distribution of fiscal 
resources and developmental benefits across the region.” Furthermore, in accordance with Savitch 
and Vogel (2000: 161), he understands cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, of which 
regional councils are one type, as manifestations of new regionalism, which is both a policy agenda 
and an action approach that enables effective metropolitan governance.23 Another example is 
 
23 According to Visser (2004: 51-52), “(a)s a policy agenda, the new regionalism promotes the cost-effective provision 
of area-wide public infrastructure and services and the equitable distribution of fiscal resources and developmental 
benefits across the region. It calls for removing intraregional barriers of access to economic and social opportunity. It 
also supports global economic competitiveness for the region and ecologically and economically sustainable patterns 
of land use and development.” As an action approach, he continues, the new regionalism “promotes regional action 
through governance, defined as the use of interorganizational collaboration rather than hierarchical regional 
government to resolve areawide public problems.” 
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Rosan (2016). In defense of bottom-up regionalism, she argues that a voluntary, collaborative 
approach to coordinating regional planning to address region-wide issues including but not limited 
to transportation and land use is a more politically and administratively feasible option in 
mobilizing effective strategies to align regional goals and priorities with local interests. Lat but not 
least, Bryan and Wolf (2010: 100-101) also summarize the United States federal, state, and local 
governments’ efforts to create “softer structural solutions emphasizing voluntary cooperative 
mechanisms among (local) governments” to help “metropolitan areas address region-wide 
problems” and “provide efficient service delivery” including “systems maintenance such as 
sewage and transportation.” 
Taking a closer look at what cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations do, 
Wikstrom (1977: 97), in his seminal study of councils of governments in the United States, 
identifies four core activities of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations: providing venue 
for community planning; facilitating planning and supporting joint planning; representing local 
governments at state levels; and conducting regional review for federal programs. Similarly, Bryan 
and Wolf (2010: 109-110) identify that there are five activities having been core part of the regional 
councils’ role since those organizations’ unprecedented growth in the 1960s: managing federal 
and state planning and review requirements; facilitating and coordinating identification of regional 
issues; operating as a technical data source; providing technical and planning-related consulting 
services; providing legislative/intergovernmental relations services; and operating regional 
programs (e.g. joint purchasing operations). Furthermore, according to Bryan and Wolf (2010: 
110-113), there are many commonalities among the regional councils in terms of kinds of 
programs and policy areas those organizations are engaged with: transportation, environmental 
protection (i.e. air and water quality management); land use; human services; housing; economic 
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and community development; and disaster preparedness. Miller and Nelles (2020: 343) have 
further modified Bryan and Wolf (2010)’s functional categories into eight activities “that cover 
the array of issue areas common to virtually every region” in the United States: economic and 
workforce development; social services; community development, housing, and public 
infrastructure financing; environmental management planning; transportation planning and 
coordination; growth management; regional public safety; and regional service 
provision/constituent services. 
 It should be noted that, despite the existence of some level of consensus within regional 
governance scholarship with regard to what important features cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations share in common (i.e. their defining attributes and activities), there is a lack of “a 
common naming convention” (Miller and Nelles, 2020) in both the academic24  and practical 
realms.25 As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020), the lack of a common naming convention results 
in a number of operationalization issues. One of such issues is that such a lack “makes large-scale 
comparative research difficult and prone to potential blind spots” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 325). 
 
24 For instance, the ACIR report, although not strictly an academic publication, uses the term voluntary metropolitan 
council; Visser (2004) and Bryan and Wolf (2010) voluntary regional council and regional COGs; Miller and Cox 
(2014) regional governing organizations (RGOs); and Feiock (2013) “councils of governments and other regional 
organizations” when they all refer to more or less the same organization. 
25 Councils of Governments (COGs), Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs), Associations of Governments, and 
Economic Development Districts (EDDs) are among many popular names of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations. According to Miller and his colleagues (2019: 94-95), there are at least thirty different naming 
conventions of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that can be categorized into RIGOs. The list will 
expand further if non-RIGO cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are taken into account. 
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 In summation, despite some operationalization issues (especially the lack of a common 
naming convention) as addressed above, as to what cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations are and what they do, regional governance scholarship and practitioners agree to 
some extent with the core principles underlying regional governance systems within which cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations are predominant: in terms of cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations’ defining attributes, they are multi-service, multi-jurisdictional 
entities, of which primarily voluntarily participating local governments are members, working to 
solve area-wide problems “bigger than any one local government”; in terms of their activities, they 
are engaged with diverse programs and policy areas specifically targeted to resolving area-wide 
problems, ranging from regional planning to disaster preparedness. 
2.1.2 Historical Change and the Evolution of Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental 
Organizations 
According to Wallis (1994b), there have been three distinct waves of attempts among local 
governments in the United States in the twentieth century to achieve regional governance.26 The 
 
26 One interesting case study that resonates to a great extent with the below general historical survey of change and 
evolution of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in the United States is the Bureau of Governmental 
Research and Service (1988). In this work, the Bureau reviews three distinct eras in the development of Councils of 
Governments in Oregon: voluntary cooperation (1945-1965); federal and state incentives and requirements (1966-
1980); and strategic localism (1981-1988). Also, according to the report, the “common thread” roles for the Councils 
of Governments in Oregon are “coalition-building, managing economic development partnerships, collecting and 
analyzing regional data, providing service, and brokering and advocacy on regional issues” (see for the detail Tollenaar, 
1988; Weitz and Seltzer, 1998). 
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first wave of (rather unsuccessful) regional governance, which coincided with the progressive 
movement, focused on “structural solutions designed to expand the sphere of the central city” 
(Wallis, 1994b: 447) and can be characterized by strategic choices, including but not limited to 
regional government and annexation,27 that “tried to draw capacity from the extension of general 
government powers – typically those of the central city – outward to encompass the region” (448). 
However, the fact that only few regional governments exist today speaks to the limited acceptance 
of the first wave regional governance strategies (Clark, 1995; Olberding, 2002a; Walker, 1987). 
This is not surprising since, particularly technical-wise, regional government and annexation are 
among the most difficult intergovernmental coordination options (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
 The second wave of regional governance occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The second 
wave, in recognition of the structural complexity and poly-centricity of regions, was “more 
procedurally oriented, focusing on objectives of comprehensiveness and coordination” (Wallis, 
1994b: 447). Therefore, the second wave was more focused on facilitating regional planning and 
area-wide program coordination (Olberding, 2002a). By and large thanks to federal 
sponsorship,2829 the number of regional councils of government reached its peak in 1977 (669), 
 
27 According to Walker (1987), annexation was especially a popular, if not the dominant, device in the 19 th century to 
bring “local jurisdictional servicing boundaries and expanding settlement patterns into proper alignment.”  
28 In this era, especially in the 1970s, 48 federal programs prioritized regional councils in funding or required a regional 
planning agency as a condition of funding (Olberding, 2002a: 252; see also Grigsby, 1996) or local grant applications 
be reviewed by a regional council (a process called A-95 review) and federal money made up as much as three fourths 
of regional councils’ budgets (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). See also Grigsby (1996). 
29  Not only the federal government but also state governments took part in encouraging local governments’ 
participation in regional councils through legislation (Whisman, 2013: 11). As of 2013, there are forty-four states 
having legislation concerning regional cooperation and regional councils (Whisman, 2013: 11). 
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but as of 2000, the number dropped to 450, according to the National Association of Regional 
Councils. Scholars suspect that this decline was partially caused by the Reagan administration’s 
budget cuts in the 1980s (for example, see Bowman and Franke, 1984; Olberding, 2002a). 
 The third wave of regional governance has occurred since the early 1990s. According to 
Dodge (1990: 354), “(t)he federally mandated regional planning efforts and the consolidation 
proposals of the past three decades are being replaced by voluntary cooperation among 
governments and sectors through public-private, ‘intercommunity partnerships.’” Wallis (1994b: ) 
notes that intergovernmental/regional partnerships forged during this wave have the following 
common features: “they stress the development of governance capacity rather than the expansion 
of government”; “they are led by coalitions of interest groups which are often cross-sectoral 
(nonprofit, private, and public)”; “they focus on areas of substantive strategic concern”; and “they 
employ facilitated processes to develop a shared vision and means of collaboration.” 
 Thus far, I have reviewed the historical development of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations. In addition, there is a functional approach to understanding various geneses of cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations: the approach Miller and Nelles (2020) take. According 
to them, differences in ways local institutions (i.e. local governments) responded to the rapid 
transformation of post-World War II American life has had a significant impact on how cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations have evolved differently in different regions of the 
United States. They identify that there were four routes that led to the development of regional-
level cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations eventually undertaking cross-boundary 
activity (335): Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs); Economic Development Districts (EDDs); 
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Councils of Governments (COGs); and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs).30 In spite 
of the United States cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations’ various geneses, an 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) occurs among those organizations as, 
although initially founded to meet federal funding requirements and/or state mandates, they take 
on additional activities beyond regional planning to address constituent members’ needs including 
program development and coordination as well as local service delivery (Bennet and Nathanson, 
1997; Miller and Nelles, 2020; Olberding, 1997 and 2002a). 
 Based on the above literature review, I summarize that cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations can be understood as, among the seventeen intergovernmental coordination options 
available, an array of moderate (either relatively easy or moderately difficult) government-centric 
options local governments voluntarily take that can be characterized as intergovernmental entities 
with state- and locally-defined boundaries that deliver a variety of federal, state, and local 
programs and regional public services and solve region-wide issues. However, this literature-
review-based definition is somewhat vague and thus can be problematic especially for 
operationalization. As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020: 337), the key problems at the level of 
operationalization arise due to that cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations “are 
sometimes membership-based, sometimes not, sometimes multipurpose, sometimes not, 
 
30 Miller and Nelles (2020: 335) provide the following account as four examples of the evolutionary paths of cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations: “Initially, the organizations were named to reflect the specific function 
they were meant to address. Those focused on urban land-use planning created organizations known as RPCs; those 
focused on economic development (primarily in rural/smaller metropolitan area) attached the federal moniker of EDDs 
to their organization; those focused on mobilizing local governments in engage with each other in primarily 
metropolitan areas became known as COGs; and those interested in urban transportation planning use the federal 
moniker of MPOs.” 
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sometimes region-wide, sometimes not, sometimes “this” and sometimes “that.”” Therefore, there 
is a need to provide a precise definition of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations at the 
level of operationalization for the purpose of rigorous analysis. 
2.1.3 Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations beyond USA 
Thus far, I have mostly relied on the regionalism literature of the United States in 
articulating what cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are and what they do. However, 
given the ubiquity of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations across the globe, efforts not 
only in other industrialized countries but also developing countries deserve scholarly attention. 
Below are selective examples of studies on regional governance and cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations beyond the United States: some of them are comparative and 
others are single country studies. 
 First of all, although not in great numbers, there exist studies comparing the United States 
cases with other countries. For example, Burnley and Murphy (1995) compare the United States 
and Australia in terms of different characteristics of exurban development and regional planning 
in the two countries. Hansen and his colleagues (1990) include the United States in their 
comparative analysis of regional policies in numerous countries. Van der Veer (1994) conducts 
comparative analysis of metropolitan areas of the Netherlands and the United States in terms of 
the degree to which those areas are centralized and regional power exercised in those areas. There 
also exist a few studies comparing systems of regional governance in the United States and 
Canadian metropolitan areas (e.g. Robinson and Webster, 1985; Rothblatt, 1994). 
 Second, as to the non-US based regional governance practices, I first take a close look at 
European countries. The European integration efforts of the past three decades have influenced all 
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of the European Union (EU) member countries in terms of how each member country governs its 
regions (de Sousa, 2013; Szmigiel-Rawska, 2016; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). As opposed to the 
United States in which metropolitan consolidation rarely takes place, many Western European 
countries have consolidated their metropolitan areas; some cases were successful, and some were 
not (Lefèvre, 1998; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). In the meanwhile, fragmentation has been a more 
common practice among Central and Eastern European countries31 (Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares 
and Feiock, 2018). The rationale of many European countries (mostly Western European 
countries)’ metropolitan consolidation efforts, like counterparts elsewhere around the world, is 
“increased capacity, economies of scale, and efficiency” (Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 300; see also 
Kopric, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2010). On the contrary, the key motivation of equally many European 
countries’ efforts to decentralize and devolve power that lead to more fragmented local 
government systems, (again) like counterparts elsewhere around the world, is to promote 
democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy (Kopric, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares and 
Feiock, 2018). However, it is relatively a recent phenomenon that intergovernmental cooperation 
efforts have received scholarly attention and the academic debate on intergovernmental 
cooperation remains not only dominated by, with only a few exceptions, a top-down perspective 
but also incomplete (see Bel and Warner, 2016; Swianiewicz, 2010; Tavares and Feiock, 2018; 
 
31 Such cases of governmental fragmentation were common among those countries especially during the 1990s in an 
effort to resurrect local democracy and abolish “territorial consolidations imposed under former communist regimes” 
(Tavares and Feiock, 2018: 300; Swianiewicz, 2010). 
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Teles, 2016; Teles and Swianiewicz, 2018).32 Some selective examples of regional governance 
reforms geared towards promoting intergovernmental cooperation include the Dutch case of 
shifting from stadsgewesten (smaller monocentric regions) to integral urban networks titled 
Regional Collaborative Associations and Deltametropolis (Haran, 2010); the English experiment 
with establishing metropolitan authorities (counties) in the six largest urban areas (Lefèvre, 1998); 
the French creation of communaute ś de communes and communaute ś de villes (Lefèvre, 1998); 
the Italian case of reorganizing its cities and municipalities into città metropolitan (Lefèvre, 1998); 
and the last but not least, the German manifestation of Regional Communities (e.g. Verband region 
Stuttgart) (Lefèvre, 1998). As presented earlier in this chapter (Figure 2), Tavares and Feiock 
(2018) use the ICA framework to draw distinctions among various types of regional governance 
in Europe that can be applicable elsewhere around the world. They identify that there are four 
distinct types of mechanism for integrating ICA problems: network embeddedness (e.g. city-
regions in the Netherlands of which Regional Collaborative Associations are one type); contracts 
(e.g. interlocal contracts in France and Norway); delegated authority (e.g. municipal corporations 
in Sweden and Germany); and imposed authority (e.g. consorcios in Spain and syndicats mixtes in 
France).33 
 
32 According to Tavares and Feiock (2018: 300), the EU member countries’ long-standing preference for top-down 
(hierarchical) and formal solutions “still puzzles American scholars seeking to comprehend the choice of governance 
arrangements to address specific ICA dilemmas.” 
33 See Hertzog (2010) for more detail on interlocal contracts in France and Jacobsen (2015) in Norway; Monti and 
Amna (2000) on municipal corporation in Sweden and Grossi and Reichard (2008) in Germany; and on consorcios in 
Spain and syndicats mixtes in France, Bel and Warner (2015) and Hulst et al. (2009). 
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 Third and last, besides the so-called Western countries (i.e. the United States, Canada, and 
the EU member countries), scholars report that there exist various types of regional governance in 
practice across the globe: examples of effective (to certain extent) regional governance in Turkey 
are West Mediterranean Economic Development Foundation (BAGEV) and South Antalya 
Tourism Development and Infrastructure Operation Union (GATAB); in Australia, Tasmania’s 
Cradle Coast Authority (CCA) is an example of regional governance that merits analysis; some 
exemplar intergovernmental cooperation takes place in the Yangtze River Delta region of China; 
and Wide Area Federations of Municipalities in Japan are the latest Japanese national 
government’s regional solutions to “enhance interlocal, collaborative public service delivery 
within multi-municipal areas, especially in areas where amalgamations (are) thought to be 
politically difficult to implement” (Jacobs, 2004: 247).34 
2.1.4 Limitations of the Current Literature on Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental 
Organizations 
Whether cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are effective means to solve 
region-wide problems and promote better standards of regional governance is not only beyond 
scope of this dissertation study but also needs further practical and academic considerations.35 In 
 
34 See Ataöv and Eraydin (2011) for more detail on regional governance in Turkey; Davidson and Lockwood (2008) 
on the Australian regional governance (especially Tasmania); Luo (2005) on the mainland Chinese case of regional 
governance; and Jacobs (2004) on the Japanese regional governance. 
35 Cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations’ effectiveness and potency, as assessed by some scholars thus far, 
do not seem that strong. According to Hamilton (2014: 248-250), cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are 
“defensive” and they give “the illusion that something is being done in order to address regional problems to prevent 
35 
this subsection, I focus not on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations’ issues and 
problems but rather on some limitations of the current literature on those organizations. 
According to Rickabaugh (2018a), because regions are not uniform in the United States 
and hence there exist many varieties of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations, regional 
governance scholars have thus far not been successful in developing an understanding of those 
organizations in a systematic way. Another limitation related to the first one is that the extant 
regional governance scholarship has “limited the universe” of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations “functionally or geographically.” Therefore, such a limited scope of functional or 
geographical understanding of cross-boundary organizations leads to a lack of generalizability. 
Furthermore, as addressed by Miller and Nelles (2020), although cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizational names have virtually zero value in “establishing or clarifying 
any specifics about the form and function of” those organizations” (328), “many different names 
have been used to signify approximately the same thing” (329) or familiar names have been applied 
inconsistently, causing confusion to regional governance scholars. Among the consequences of 
this confusion is a research dilemma: “(i)n the absence of a broad consensus about which 
organizations matter or are the “right” manifestations of American regional intergovernmentalism 
the scholarship has had to develop an imprecisely defined and tacitly circulated perception of 
 
any more powerful or drastic regional governmental reorganization.” He also criticizes those organizations as: “hav 
(ing) failed to develop strong political support from the state or among local governments; remain as advisory and 
planning bodies without the means to implement their plans; continued (to be) dependent on federal government 
funding; and have been able to create only a weak sense of the region for planning purposes and almost no political 
or administrative regional identity” (Hamilton, 2014: 249 as quoted in Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336). Furthermore, 
Hall (2009: 71 as quoted in Miller and Nelles, 2020: 336) adds to this criticism by asserting “COGs with rules like 
‘one jurisdiction-one vote’ are perfect examples of the structural problems facing regions.” 
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regions and the cross-boundary organizations that embody them” (350). Although some effort has 
been made to define cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in a broad, consistent 
manner, even those definitions have been “applied loosely and with notable exceptions” (350). 
Therefore, as Miller and Nelles (2020: 328) lament, “it is very difficult to evaluate the state of 
regional governance in America partially because, to date, there has been no consensus about how 
to identify or measure it within regional organizations.” Also, related to this difficulty, one crucial 
problem of the lack of a common lexicon, as noted by Miller and Nelles (2020: 351) is that such a 
lack “makes large-scale comparative research difficult and prone to potential blind spots.” 
2.2 Extant Literature on RIGOs 
As noted by Miller and Nelles (2020), previous attempts to conceptualize and 
operationalize regional governance focusing on the role of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations have suffered from a lack of conceptual precision and consensus. Miller and Nelles 
(2020; see also Miller et al., 2019, especially 81-102)’ proposal of a system of studying cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations, although having not yet gained much popularity in the 
domain of regional governance scholarship,36 enables us to pursue a “fruitful line of investigation” 
(337) especially in conducting comparative research. Their framework is useful as it not only 
 
36 As of the time of this writing, there are three academic publications that cite Miller and Nelles’ peer-reviewed article 
(2020) and ten publications that cite Miller and his colleagues’ collective work (2019). This is most likely due to that 
it has been only two years since their introduction of the RIGO framework. 
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provides conceptual definitions but also provides detailed accounts of how they can be 
operationalized for research purposes. 
In this section, I first outline the RIGO framework developed by Miller and Nelles (2020; 
see also Miller et al., 2019, especially 81-102) in the first subsection and then discuss some 
strengths of it in the following subsection. 
2.2.1 Defining and Operationalizing the Five Properties of RIGOs 
To develop a general framework of what a RIGO is, Miller and Nelles (2020) first identify 
five properties that either regional councils loosely share or voluntary metropolitan councils would 
have in the ideal world envisioned by the ACIR. Then they define and operationalize those 
properties to identify RIGOs in the United States. There are 477 cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations that fit Miller and Nelles’ definition of RIGOs.37 As to what those five properties 
are, they are membership, agenda, legitimacy, ambition, and scale. 
 First, RIGOs’ membership property refers to whether a cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organization is “primarily constituted by general-purpose local governments” 38  regardless of 
whether it is a self-organized one or created in response to the higher governments’ requirements 
(Miller and Nelles, 2020: 340; see also Miller et al., 2019: 86). To qualify as a RIGO, a cross-
boundary organization should be constituted largely, if not exclusively, by local governments and, 
 
37 The US RIGO database is available at http://metrostudies.pitt.edu/RIGOData. 
38 They are basic local authorities, and examples are counties and municipalities in the United States; districts in 
England; communes in France; and Gemeinde in Germany. 
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as to its governing body (where applicable), it should be composed of at least fifty-one percent of 
representatives from local governments. 
 Second, whether a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization has agenda that cover 
an array of policy areas is another criterion that it has to meet to qualify as a RIGO. Miller and 
Nelles (2020; see also Miller et al., 2019) modify Bryan and Wolf (2010)’s list of regional council 
program areas into eight categories of activities. Table 3 below is an abridged version of Miller 
and Nelles (2020)’ table. A cross-boundary intergovernmental organization must be engaged in as 
little as three of the below mentioned activities to qualify as a RIGO.3940 
 
 
39 Miller and Nelles (2020: 342) propose three activities as “the threshold to be as certain as possible that the 
organization is multipurpose … while ensuring that the broadest number of organizations could meet this criterion.” 
40 According to Miller and Nelles (2020: 342), “(p)articipation in at least one of the sub-activities could satisfy that 
requirement. For instance, to be active in transportation planning in coordination, a RIGO could be engaged in either 
rural or urban transportation.” 
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Table 3. Policy and Program Areas that Constitute Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations’ 
Activities 
 
Source: Miller et al. (2019: 88) 
 
 Third, legitimacy is concerned with a form of organizational legitimacy. To qualify as a 
RIGO that is legitimate in the eyes of the higher tiers of government (e.g. state and federal in the 
United States; provincial and national in South Korea), a cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organization must be seen as “the primary representative of the region’s governments and their 
collective interests” (Miller et al., 2019: 87) by appropriate higher-tier government agencies. 
Therefore, legitimacy defined and operationalized by Miller and Nelles (2020: 344; see also Miller 
et al., 2019: 87-89) is “more “top-down” than “bottom-up”” as it concerns more with service 
delivery than democracy (on the issue of “performance legitimacy” versus “democratic legitimacy,” 
see Lipset, 1984; Mcloughlin, 2015; Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2004). In the United 
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States case, in thirty-two states, state and local governments have identified and designated a single 
cross-boundary membership-based intergovernmental organization for each and every region of 
the state. In other states, multiple policy/program designations assigned to cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations (e.g. MPOs, RTPOs, and EDDs) are perceived to be indicative of 
their high degree of acceptance as valid regional representatives especially by appropriate higher-
tier government agencies (e.g. MPOs and RTPOs by the US Department of Transportation; EDDs 
by the US Economic Development Administration, a bureau within the US Department of 
Commerce). 
 Fourth, the degree to which a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization “desires to 
be considered an agent of the region as well as an agent of its governmental constituents” (Miller 
et al., 2019: 89) is another important property to take into account when disentangling RIGOs from 
other types of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. Ambition, as understood by 
Miller and his colleagues (2019: 89), is not a concept that can be captured in terms of performance 
or practice, but by a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization’s intent to represent the region 
and be the voice for it. As such, to quality as a RIGO, a cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organization should strive to represent regional interests that transcend a mere aggregation of local 
governments’ interests. Therefore, whereas organizational legitimacy, the third property, is 
concerned with the verticality of intergovernmental relations, ambition deals with the horizontality. 
However, as Miller and Nelles (2020) admit, ambition is the most difficult one to operationalize 
among the five properties. As far as the ambition dimension is concerned, a cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organization qualifies as a RIGO if there is any textual evidence that it strives 
to take part in “identifying, articulating, negotiating, deciding, or implementing regional solutions 
to area-wide problems” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 345). The below table that I adopt from Miller 
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and his colleagues (2019: 89) helps build a clearer understanding of ambition of RIGOs: in the 
table, varying degrees of ambition are listed in the order of increasing aggressiveness (1 = timid; 
2 = modest; and 3 and 4 =highly aggressive). 
 
Table 4. Varying Degrees of Ambition of Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations 
 
Source: Miller et al. (2019: 89) 
 
 Fifth and last, scale is a property defined and operationalized to distinguish RIGOs from 
geographically smaller-scale cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. This scale 
distinction is necessary because of the following two reasons. First, practical. In many regions, 
there are multiple cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations having the above four 
properties.41 Among those organizations, the one that represents “the largest territory in which a 
 
41 Any organization that has the four properties is referred to as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) by Miller 
and his colleagues (2019). “Anytime two or more local governments get together to formally engage in discussion and 
actions on multiple issues they create an IGO” (Miller et al., 2019: 84). 
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set of local governments address common policy problems” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 347) is 
typically the most visible, and hence the easiest one to find and monitor. Second, methodological. 
As Miller and his colleagues (2019) find, the largest-scale organization in the region tends to have 
most power to fulfill the primary functions of regional governance. 
 In summation, membership and agenda are concerned with RIGOs’ organizational 
identification (i.e. what they are and what they do). A cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organization that qualifies as a RIGO can be understood as, membership-wise, composed of 
general-purpose local governments; agenda-wise, it covers a broad array of policies and programs 
targeted to solve region-wide issues. In the meanwhile, legitimacy and ambition are the properties 
concerning internal and external (or vertical and horizontal) credibility of a cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organization. A RIGO qualifier is regarded as the voice of the region not only 
by the higher tiers of government (legitimacy) but also by its constituents as it desires to represent 
the regional interests (ambition). Also, scale matters for the sake of practicality and parsimony. 
2.2.2 Strengths of the RIGO Framework 
Thanks to Miller and his colleagues’ effort (2019; see also Miller and Nelles, 2020), we 
now have a broad picture of the 477 cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in the United 
States that look alike. Then, it is natural to think their project can be replicated elsewhere across 
the world. Indeed, with the five properties of the RIGO framework, we can conduct large-scale 
comparative research including cross-national studies of RIGOs.  
One of the greatest strengths of the RIGO framework is that it provides “a conceptual 
lingua franca” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 351) that enables us to discern RIGOs from non-RIGOs 
in the universe of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations. Such a differentiation can be 
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carried out outside of the United States too. For example, in the case of France, we can now discern 
communauté de communes and communauté d'agglomération, French RIGOs, from syndicats 
mixtes; in the Netherlands, Regional Collaborative Associations from Deltametropolis; in Turkey, 
GATAB from BAGEV; in Japan, Koiki Rengo (Wide Area Federation of Municipalities: MFs) 
from Ichibu Jimu Kumiai (Partial Administrative Unions); and CCA from the Local Government 
Association of Queensland in Australia. And the list can go on and on. Once we have different 
countries’ RIGOs teased out from their respective pools of cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations, we can conduct comparative studies of RIGOs across the world. In other words, we 
can compare, for example, RIGOs in the United States with communauté de communes, 
communauté d'agglomération, Regional Collaborative Associations, GATAB, Koiki Rengo and 
CCA, as, in Tavares and Feiock (2018: 303)’s terminology, they are all contract-bound, multi-
purpose intermunicipal associations (see Figure 2) having “intermediate institutional scope” and, 
in terms of the RIGO framework, they are all organizations possessing the five properties. 
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3.0 Understanding Regional Intergovernmental Organizations of South Korea 
Individuals’ perceptions are not only influenced by culture (e.g. Ekman and Friedsen, 1971; 
Hofstede, 1991 and 2001; Kastanakis and Voyer, 2014) but also organizational reforms and 
institutional changes (e.g. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Rafferty and Restubog, 2017; Saksvik et 
al., 2007) as well as history (Linder and Peters, 1989; Miller, 2002). Concerning the influence of 
history on individual perceptions, Miller (2002: 8) notes, “historical context frames and structures 
where we are headed.” Therefore, since the purpose of this dissertation study is to better understand 
South Korean public officials’ perceptions of cross-boundary multi-lateral collaboration, in 
addition to the literature review of Western knowledge of regional governance, I provide the 
cultural, organizational, and historical contexts within which those officials are embedded before 
the actual analysis of their perceptions. In so doing, I first provide a brief historical background of 
the South Korean regional governance as well as some major reforms related to it in the first 
section. Then, in the second section, I summarize the extant regional governance literature of South 
Korea. In the last section, I apply the RIGO framework to studying the South Korean case of 
regional governance to test the exportability of the framework beyond the United States boundary. 
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3.1 South Korea’s Local Autonomy and Regional Governance 
Regional governance is a new child of local autonomy, which is almost equally young, in 
South Korea.42 Therefore, before advancing to the country review of regional governance, I first 
briefly provide the history of local autonomy in South Korea as well as some weaknesses of, and 
threats to, it. 
The Korean peninsula has been ruled by a strong central government for centuries. After 
the division of Korea into North and South in 1948, although there were some episodic and erratic 
efforts to establish local autonomy in South Korea, the national leaders, in particular military 
dictatorships, had long overridden the embodiment of local autonomy on the grounds that agendas 
such as economic development, administrative efficiency, and reunification (with North Korea) 
should be prioritized (Cho et al., 2010). However, from the early 1990s, “some degree of local 
autonomy” (Cho et al., 2010) has emerged along with the development, deepening, and 
consolidation of democracy in the country: in 1995, the country held local elections for the first 
time in a half-century, again in 1998, and then every four years since (Choi and Wright, 2004; Tao, 
2016; Cho et al., 2010). Since 1995, intergovernmental relations (IGR)43 in the country have been 
 
42 Although the original Constitution of South Korea stipulated local autonomy and local election, local autonomy had 
been long dismissed and suppressed during the protracted period of military rule (1961-1987). It has been only two 
decades and a half since the country saw the resurgence of local autonomy. 
43 IGR, both a behavioral and an institutional concept, as defined by Krane and Wright (1998: 1168), is, behavioral-
wise, “(t)he various combinations of interdependencies and influences among public officials – elected and appointed 
– in all types and levels of governmental units, with particular emphasis on financial, policy, and political issues.” 
Institutional-wise, the concept emphasizes the division of authority and functions as well as intergovernmental 
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renewed (at least nominally), and accordingly, some related-institutional features have been also 
changed.44 Appendix A provides a short summary of the current political and administrative 
structures of local government in South Korea and the below table describes a brief history of 
evolutionary phases of South Korean local autonomy. 
 
 
functional and fiscal transfers (vertical) among governments. Also, “formal, legal, institutional, and fiscal 
interjurisdictional arrangements are major features of the institutional approach (Choe et al, 2010: 398). 
44 Here, I refer to institutional changes, by modifying Wright (1987; see also Choi and Wright, 2004: 2), changes in 
national-provincial-local, provincial-local, national-local, and interlocal relationships; changes in the attitudes and 
actions of public officials, especially perceptions or images of officials operating in other political jurisdictions; 
changes in the regularity, consistency, and patterns of interactions among governing officials as they span inter-
jurisdictional boundaries; changes in the roles and significance of all public officials, both appointed and elected; and 
changes in the prominence of policy and political issues with particular attention to financial relationships, including 
assignment of functional responsibilities, taxing and revenue raising authority, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and 
policy implementation and evaluation efforts. 
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Table 5. Evolutionary Phases of Intergovernmental Relations in South Korea 
 
Source: Choi and Wright (2004: 3) 
 
However, some scholars (e.g. Choi and Wright, 2004: 3) argue that “the short experience 
of autonomous administration by local governments in South Korea has not produced a significant 
degree of decentralization or substantial local autonomy,” especially due to local governments’ 
lack of operational autonomy.45 That is, “a large portion of resources and power still remains” with 
 
45 See also Tao (2016) and Cho et al. (2010). In a comparative perspective, it seems that only a small portion of power, 
responsibility, and resources has been devolved to local governments in South Korea. According to Cho and his 
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the national government and thus supervision by the national government over local government 
still exhibits on the characteristics of national guardianship, making the nature of national-local 
relations still “tightly-coupled” (Choi and Wright, 2004: 8-9). Not only the imbalance in 
distribution of power, policy responsibility, and resources between national and local 
governments, but scholars also address fiscal unbalance, both vertical and horizontal,46 and “weak 
self-governing competency of local governments” (Cho et al., 2010) as pressing issues that affect 
the quality of local autonomy. Thus, those scholars argue that local autonomy in the country is 
“still in the fledgling stage” (Cho et al., 2010).  
Leaving aside the quality of the South Korean local autonomy for a moment, one prominent 
trend related to decentralization and local autonomy that has emerged in the country is city-county 
consolidation as a means to address region-wide problems.47 Such a trend is worrisome since, as 
 
colleagues (2010: 381), “(a)mong the total of all governmental functions, roughly one-fourth belong to local 
government,” which is relatively low when compared with countries like “Japan (34%), France (40%), and the United 
States (50%).” 
46 Especially with regard to the issue of horizontal fiscal unbalance, Kim (2002), for example, reveals that there is a 
great variation in the fiscal independence ratio (ratio of own-source revenues to total revenues) of local governments 
in the country: the ratios that fiscally affluent Seoul and six other cities exhibit are more than 60% whereas the 
provincial and local fiscal independence ratios (excluding the seven cities) are approximately 35% and 21% 
respectively. In other words, “there is wide disparity in the fiscal capacities among various local governments” (Choi 
and Wright, 2004). 
47 An interesting fact is that city-county consolidations in the country are heavily centered on a particular period. 
During the period from 1995 to 2012, forty-four consolidated local governments were established by merging forty-
four cities and forty-four counties: thirty-nine created in 1995; one in 1998; two in 2005; one in 2010 and one in 2012) 
(see Appendix B for the full list of the newly created cities during this period). In the same period, there were also 
nine failed consolidation attempts because of the opposition of residents. 
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reviewed in the previous chapter, consolidation is a more difficult intergovernmental coordination 
option and South Korea is no exception. This is all the more dismaying since empirical findings 
on the South Korean case of city-county consolidation are not supportive of the current mainstream 
approach to promoting regional governance. 48  Then, a question arises. Why, among many 
available regional governance options, do South Korean local governments choose to consolidate 
over other options although the empirical evidence suggests otherwise?  
Some scholars suspect that, while local governments in the United States have consolidated 
with the aim of enhancing efficiency (Miller, 2002; Rusk, 1993), the South Korean national 
government had a different motivation when it coerced many cities and counties to consolidate: to 
control local governments more efficiently in an implicit manner (J. Hong, 2005; J. Park, 2013). 
In the meanwhile, one noteworthy scholar’s empirical findings point out to politicians at the 
national level (i.e. Members of the National Assembly) wanting to maximize their self-interest (as 
consolidation would give them greater territorial power as well as weaken and/or reduce the 
number of their potential contestants, which are highly likely incumbent mayors) as the prime 
proponent of city-county consolidation (J. Yoo, 2015). He also makes a regretful comment that, 
although other policy options (such as special purpose district, association of local governments, 
and outsourcing) are technically available, the so-called “larger is better” belief persists not only 
 
48 For instance, B. Min (2013) finds that South Korea’s city-county consolidation has thus far failed to deliver 
improvement in technical efficiency, improvement in fiscal management, or narrowing regional (urban vs rural) 
disparities. J. Park (2010)’s analysis results also testify that city-county consolidation is associated with an increase in 
the level of debt burden of local government, which is consistent with many non-Korean case studies that consolidated 
governments are likely to result in higher debt burdens (e.g. Blomquist and Parks, 1996; Rosentraub, 2000; Savitch 
and Vogel, 2004). On the contrary, the South Korean case study findings also suggest that the effect of economies of 
scale incurred by consolidation is dubious or mixed at best (J. Yi and S. Cho, 2000; J. Yoo and H. Son, 2009). 
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among the public but also experts to the extent that they think consolidation is the only successful 
option (J. Yoo, 2010; 2015). 
In spite of the fact that the most prominent regional governance option exercised in South 
Korea is city-county consolidation, although in a limited scope, other options too are used. Besides 
city-county consolidation, there are three policy options that have been used by local governments 
since the country’s Local Autonomy Act provides formal grounds for the development of those 
policies as desirable means of regional governance: they are entrustment of affairs, local 
government association, and administrative consultative council. Appendix C offers articles, 
sections, and subsections that are relevant to the three types of regional governance in terms of 
their legal, organizational, and procedural aspects. 
As stipulated by the Local Autonomy Act, entrustment of affairs refers to the act of a local 
government or the head thereof entrusting part of its administrative and/or policy affairs within its 
competence to any other local government or the head thereof to manage such part of affairs. 
Therefore, it can be loosely defined as a type of interlocal service contract (or agreement) (see 
Table 1 and Table 2). To the best of my knowledge, as of the time of writing, since 1995, fifty-
five cases of entrustment of affairs have taken place (heavily centered in 2000 with twenty-one 
cases) in a number of policy domains including water and sewage services, waste management, 
road construction, education, and for-profit public enterprise management. According to I. Kang 
(2007), this type of regional governance has not grown in popularity due to three reasons: first, the 
Local Autonomy Act does not explicitly state the role of local councils in reaching entrustment 
agreements between local governments, and such a lack of institutional arrangements results in an 
accountability issue that makes local governments (especially managerial bodies) reluctant to enter 
into agreements; second, since the Act is too vaguely defined to allow such agreements, local 
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government officials who tend to be the so-called “buck-passers” prefer better-articulated regional 
governance choices; and last, the national government, which still exercises considerable power 
and influence over local governments, does not provide strong incentives to local governments to 
engage in this type of policy project. 
A local government association, as defined by the Local Autonomy Act, is a juristic person 
established for joint performance of one or more administrative and/or policy affairs by two or 
more local governments. Therefore, this type of regional governance is a South Korean equivalent 
of regional special districts and authorities (see Table 1 and Table 2). As of the time of writing, 
there exist six local government associations (of which two are Free Economic Zones (FEZs) with 
the primary purpose of economic development, other three are related to transportation 
infrastructure-building and operation, and the remaining one is to promote informatization of local 
governments). According to I. Kang (2007), this type of regional governance also suffers from the 
lack of legal clarity and, as the national government officials exploits this issue to their advantage, 
operational bases of local government associations tend to be problematic in terms of 
accountability (as they are predominantly represented by national-level career officials and experts) 
and governance (as their autonomy is usually restricted by Minister of the Interior and Safety) 
issues. 
Administrative consultative council is also a manifestation of local governments’ joint 
performance of part of any administrative and/or policy affairs involving two or more local 
governments. Legally, the only difference between local government association and 
administrative consultative council is that, while the former has to be a juristic person, the latter 
does not necessarily have to be. Definitionally, this type of regional governance is a South Korean 
equivalent of regional council or COG (see Table 1 and Table 2). As of the time of writing, there 
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are 89 administrative consultative councils covering fifty-three regions of South Korea. Once again, 
as with the above-mentioned two types of regional governance, administrative consultative 
councils also suffer from the lack of institutional arrangements and legal clarity (I. Kang, 2007). 
Nonetheless, given its “malleable” nature, administrative consultative councils prevail as the 
dominant type of regional governance and, as shall be explained in the last section of this chapter, 
this type of regional governance is the most prominent candidate for the South Korean RIGO 
equivalent that merits further analysis. Therefore, administrative consultative councils shall be 
reviewed further in detail in the last section. 
3.2 Extant Literature on Regional Governance in South Korea 
Paralleling the two and a half decades-long proliferation of city-county consolidation in 
South Korea, studies on consolidation have flourished. My extensive academic and government 
database search of the South Korean literature49 yields that there are 205 articles published on city-
 
49 In search for academic and professional publications on regional governance in South Korea (keywords including 
regional governance, city-county consolidation, intergovernmental relations, local governments and autonomy, 
decentralization, interlocal agreement, interlocal contract, intergovernmental cooperation as well as coordination and 
collaboration, and regional council and council of governments) I used the following databases: Google Scholar 
(https://scholar.google.com), Naver Academic (https://academic.naver.com), DBPIA (http://www.dbpia.co.kr), and 
RISS (http://www.riss.kr/index.do). 
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county consolidation: of which twenty-seven have appeared in peer-reviewed journals50 and the 
rest in academic journals; the first article ever published on this policy issue dates back to 1994; 
and six-seven articles have been published in public administration-related journals while twenty-
two in policy-related journals and nineteen in geography journals. Surprisingly, only five articles 
on city-county consolidation have been published in Economics-related journals. There are 102 
masters theses and forty-five doctoral theses on city-county consolidation, of which fifty-three 
belong to the academic domain of public administration and nine to urban affairs. Concerning 
expert reports, 127 publications are available to the public via government websites. 
 On the contrary, perhaps demonstrating the lack of both academic and professional 
attention paid to other regional governance choices, my database search of the South Korean 
literature yields that there are only four academic (including peer-reviewed) articles published on 
entrustment of administrative and/or policy affairs51; a mere fourteen articles, zero thesis, and five 
professional/expert reports on local government association; and seven articles, nine theses, and 
two professional/expert reports on administrative consultative council (i.e. council of 
governments). As the primary focus of the literature review is to identify and examine studies on 
 
50 They include some of the top-tier KCI-indexed, peer-reviewed journals in public administration and urban affairs 
such as Korean Public Administration Review, Korean Policy Studies Review, and Journal of the Korean Urban 
Management Association. 
51 As opposed to the scant research on contracting-out between local governments, there are a plenty of studies 
investigating government, both national and local, contracting-out to the private sector, numbered as many as 204 
academic journal articles, 339 master and doctoral theses, and 829 professional and expert reports. 
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council of governments in South Korea, I provide the details of the existing studies on councils of 
governments only, which can be summarized as the table below.52 
 




 As above, studies on administrative consultative councils are a rarity in South Korea. Even 
more scant are correlations / experimental studies providing methodologically robust evidence 
related to the actual practices and the real (as well as potential) impact of administrative 
consultative councils although there is a call for further empirically driven research given the 
existence of a large number of them (as mentioned above, at least 220 as of the time of writing) 
that we know very little about. In sum, the South Korean regional governance scholarship has been 
faced with more or less the same issues as the United States regional scholarship has with regard 
to research into cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations (primarily councils of 
governments): there exist only a small number of studies investigating cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations (especially from a wider geographic scope) and they are now at 
 
52 I classify the studies on administrative consultative council into two types: explorative / descriptive and correlational 
/ experimental. Explorative /descriptive studies refer to studies that do not involve any manipulation, hypothesis test, 
and measurement whereas correlational studies involve measurement and hypothesis test but no manipulation. 
Experimental studies involve manipulation, hypothesis test, and measurement. See Denzin (2017) and Huron (2013) 
for more. 
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least ten years old; the absolute majority of previous studies of administrative consultative councils 
are explorative / descriptive, heavily case-study-driven, and narrow in terms of geographic scope; 
and therefore the extant regional governance studies especially on cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations (with a particular focus on the three regional governance options 
as stipulated by the Local Autonomy Act) lack “underlying conceptual structure and empirical 
breadth.” Therefore, in the below section, I attempt to make a humble academic contribution by 
testing the exportability of the RIGO framework to the South Korean case to clarify some 
conceptual issues and also provide some empirical breadth to the existing (rather shallow) depth. 
3.3 Testing Exportability of the RIGO Framework: Using the South Korean Case 
To test the exportability of the RIGO framework beyond the United States boundaries, I 
use the South Korean case.53 In so doing, I rely on Miller and his colleagues’ (2019) framework 
of “what is means to be a RIGO” (15). As demonstrated earlier, their framework is useful as it not 
 
53 According to Peters (2013: 39), most comparative research involves “purposeful, rather than random, selection of 
the cases,” and in selecting the case of this study, I apply the strategy identified by Przeworski and Teune (1970, as 
quoted in Peters, 2013: 40), which is the most different systems design, since this study is more “variable-based 
research” aimed at testing whether the RIGO concept can “survive being transported across a range of very different 
countries” (Peters, 2013: 43). Among the many differences between the United States and South Korea are, unlike the 
United States, the Korean peninsula has been ruled by a strong central government for centuries, and the South Korean 
governance system remains largely bureaucracy-centric, “hierarchical” (Kim and Han, 2015: 703), and top-down in 
decision-making (see also Appendix A for a better understanding of the current political and administrative structures 
of local government in South Korea).  
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only provides conceptual definitions but also provides detailed accounts of how they can be 
operationalized for research purposes. As to collecting data, I use various data sources to obtain 
information on administrative consultative councils.54 
Although I do not rule out the potential and possibility of other public, private, and 
nonprofit organizations’ participation in cross-boundary multi-lateral collaboration, I use the term 
membership exclusively for local governments’ membership of a RIGO as I take a government-
centric approach like Miller and his colleagues do. I refer to multi-agenda as a set of organizational 
objectives, or agendas, that a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization like a RIGO strives 
to achieve. Those organizational objectives can be also translated as policy goals as RIGOs, 
regardless of their original mandate, engage in a great number of policy areas and deliver public 
services that cover wide policy domains. Miller and his colleagues’ (2019) modification of Bryan 
and Wolf’s (2010) identification of voluntary regional councils’ programs suggests that there are 
broadly eight key policy areas that RIGOs engage in: economic and workforce development; social 
services; community development, housing, and public infrastructure financing; environmental 
management planning;  transportation planning and coordination; growth management; regional 
public safety; and regional service provision and constituent services. I identify all types of policy 
and program areas that South Korean cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations are engaged 
 
54  Databases I use for the purpose of data collection include databases of National Association of Mayors 
(http://www.namk.or.kr), Governors Association of Korea (https://www.gaok.or.kr), the Korean Statistical 
Information Service (https://kosis.kr), the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (e.g. 
https://www.mois.go.kr/frt/bbs/type001/commonSelectBoardList.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000013; 
https://www.mois.go.kr/frt/sub/a05/statistics/screen.do), and the National Archives of Korea 
(http://www.archives.go.kr). 
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in and sort them into eight categories in accordance with Miller and his colleagues’ (2019) 
classification of policy and program areas (see the below table for operational details). 
 
Table 7. Policy and Program Areas that Constitute Cross-Boundary Intergovernmental Organizations’ 
Activities – Comparison between the United States and South Korea 
 
 
According to Miller and his colleagues’ criterion of multi-agenda, a cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organization must be engaged in at least three of the above eight key policy 
areas in order to qualify as a RIGO. Miller and his colleagues (2019: 20) understand legitimacy is 
something that resides in the eyes of the higher levels of government (i.e. state / provincial and 
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federal / national government and their agencies), and thus is “more top-down than bottom-up” 
and there is a strong sense of verticality pertaining to intergovernmental relations in their definition 
of legitimacy. I employ the term ambition from Miller and his colleagues (2019) without any 
additional nuance. Ambition, which is a property that concerns the horizontal dimension of 
intergovernmental relations, refers to a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization’s ambition 
to be the voice for regional interests rather than just each individual member’s interests. Measuring 
this concept enables us to better understand what a RIGO’s “regional orientation and commitment 
to regional interest” (Miller et al., 2019: 23) are that are bigger than just its members’ individual 
or aggregated interests. Last, I borrow the term scale from Miller and his colleagues (2019: 23) to 
identify a cross-boundary intergovernmental organization’s extent to which it scales “to represent 
the largest territory in which a set of local governments address common policy problems.” A 
cross-boundary intergovernmental organization that represents the largest territory within its 
region qualifies as a RIGO. 
 In South Korea, there are 226 local governments. Of those 226 local governments, there 
are 192 local governments that are members of some form of administrative consultative councils 
(see Appendix D for the list of local governments that are members of administrative consultative 
councils). On average, each local government is a member of 3.61 administrative consultative 
councils. As to the number of administrative consultative councils, there are eighty-nine in total, 
whether operant or dormant. Of those eighty-nine administrative councils, there are seventeen 
IGOs that do not qualify as a RIGO and forty-four perfunctory cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations that do not qualify either as an IGO or a RIGO. The remaining twenty-eight qualify 
as RIGOs (see Appendix E for the list of administrative councils that are RIGOs, IGOs, and neither 
of them). The below is a graphic representation of the South Korean territory in terms of areas that 
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are covered by RIGOs (in blue), IGOs (in orange), and administrative consultative councils that 
are neither of them (in grey) or that are not covered at all (also in grey). 
 
 
Figure 3. Area Coverage of Administrative Consultative Councils in South Korea 
 
 In below, I discuss some general characteristics of the twenty-eight RIGOs of South Korea 
in detail. First of all, the grand total population the twenty-eight RIGOs serve adds up to 
36,476,974 (2019). That Figure suggests that, as of 2019, at least 70% of South Koreans live within 
a RIGO.  In term of the size of the South Korean RIGOs, the largest RIGO in terms of the aggregate 
population of its constituent local governments is Anyang Stream Basin Administrative 
Consultative Council whereas the smallest is Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative Consultative 
Council. As to the age of the South Korean RIGOs, the oldest is Central Gyeonggi Administrative 
Consultative Council (founded in 1981) whereas the most recently established RIGO is Central 
and West Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative Council (established in 2017). In average, 7.4 
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local governments are a member of a RIGO in the country. With regard to policy and program 
areas that the South Korean RIGOs are engaged in, twenty-three RIGOs provide services related 
to economic and workforce development; twenty-three engaged in community development, 
housing, and public infrastructure financing; twelve in environmental management and planning; 
twelve in transportation planning and coordination; twelve in growth management; three in 
regional public safety; and twenty-three in regional service provision and constituent services. It 
is noteworthy that there is no RIGO in the country providing social services. Table 8 illustrates the 
distribution of the South Korean RIGOs by population size and region (i.e. province) and Table 9 
shows the populations of them in terms of the minimum (the smallest RIGO), the maximum (the 
largest RIGO), and the average by region. As oppose to the case of the United States,55 the formal 
names of the South Korean RIGOs, without an exception, bear “Administrative Consultative 
Council.” 
 Other indicators that inform of some other characteristic of the South Korean RIGOs are, 
as summarized in Table 10, the average number of local governments participating as a member 
of a RIGO and the number of policy and programs that an average RIGO is engaged in. The 
regional breakdown of the average number of local governments and the number of activity (that 
Miller and his colleagues refer to as “Activity Index”) into some regional factors that might have 
impact on the South Korean RIGOs. The average numbers of local governments are high in the 
Seoul metropolitan area and the province of Gyeongsangnam. Although there is insufficient 
evidence to understand the exact roles of population density and the degree to which areas are 
developed (e.g. whether they are industrialized or infrastructure-wise advanced or transportation-
 
55  As identified by Miller and his colleagues (2019: 94-95), although most frequently used are “Council” and 
“Association,” there are at least thirty different naming conventions of RIGOs in the United States. 
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wise well-connected), various government statistics show that the Seoul metropolitan area and 
Gyeongsangnam are the two most densely-populated and developed regions of South Korea. As 
to the activity index, there is not a significant variation in the number of activities that the South 
Korean RIGOs are engaged in.
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Table 9. RIGOs by Province and Population Size 
 
 




Although another index that Miller and his colleagues (2019) use, which is the Regional 
Power Diffusion Index (RPDI),56 would be helpful also in the South Korean context to better 
understand RIGOs there, a Korean version of it is not attainable for now due to that, given the 
South Korean local governments’ very high reliance on the national government especially 
regarding financial affairs,57 there is not a guarantee that the South Korean local governments’ 
revenue-generating or expenditure activities are largely insulated from the influence of the national 
government. 
 Furthermore, as historical context, RIGO formation is rather a new phenomenon in South 
Korea. As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 1 subsection 2), while there were a few important 
historical impulses that have shaped RIGOs of the United States, there does not seem to be a 
historically influential incident in the South Korean case besides the 1995 local elections. In this 
 
56 The RPDI “measures the diffusion of local government activity between those institutions within the boundary of 
the RIGO” and is “a way to assess the jurisdictional environment within which the RIGO operates as it can affect how 
the RIGO can interact with those local government” (Miller et al., 2019: 96). For example, a “high number indicates 
that that environment is made up of multiple actors that make regional discussions and deliberations complex by virtue 
of the number of players. A small number indicates fewer actors or a small number of large players. As such, with 
fewer players those deliberations and discussions might be easier to foster” (Miller et al., 2019: 96). Statistically, the 
RPDI is “the square root of the percentage of contribution of each government” to the region, whether that contribution 
be revenue or expenditure (Miller et al., 2019). 
57 As scholars address, the South Korean national government has had excessive power or authority over the local 
government’s taxing and spending. The national government’s control of local taxes is “exceedingly tight, while local 
discretion to shape spending priorities is slight” (C. Park, 2006: 13). Also, the local government is “limited in its 
ability to increase local revenues through borrowing” (C. Park, 2006: 13-14). Moreover, the national government “can 
enforce the local government’s fiscal responsibility” through “a multitude of rules and regulations” (C. Park, 2006: 
14). See also Cho et al. (2010) on the ongoing controversy over the South Korean fiscal decentralization. 
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context, the 1995 surge in the number of RIGOs is understandable and further historical analysis 
is needed to clarify what has influenced the recent (2015) surge. Beside the two mentioned cases, 
it can be said that the number of RIGOs has increased in a steady manner. Table 11 below shows 
percent of RIGOs formed by year and cumulatively in South Korea. 
 
Table 11. Percent of RIGOs Formed by Year and Cumulatively 
 
 
 This section of the chapter has laid out the first broad effort to understand a particular form 
of cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations in South Korea and examine whether that form, 
like in the United States case, can be labeled as RIGOs. Also, this section is, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first ever attempt to test the exportability of the RIGO framework beyond the 
United States boundaries. One contribution of the data collection and descriptive analysis as 
summarized in this section is that, by demonstrating that there exist at least twenty-eight RIGOs 
in South Korea, I suggest that the RIGO framework has rich potential for comparing cross-
boundary intergovernmental organizations in a cross-national manner. 
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4.0 Research Design, Methods and Data 
In this chapter, I present research questions, hypotheses, and research design of this 
dissertation study in the first two sections. In the last section of this chapter, I present a set of Q 
statements used for the areas of inquiry of this study. As repeatedly stated, the purpose of this 
dissertation research is to better understand how South Korean local government officials perceive 
the current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-
boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. To this end, I employ Q 
methodology to investigate those officials’ patterns of attitudes toward RIGOs through which 
multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments is implemented, enforced, 
and promoted. In the first section of this chapter, I develop research questions and also propose 
hypotheses corresponding to the research questions. In the second section, I describe research 
design of this study especially in terms of the procedural and analytical aspects of Q methodology. 
Finally, I present the selection process of Q statements and also discuss Q statements selected for 
the inquiry of this dissertation study. 
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As Smith (2001) argues, Q methodology, which is a semi-qualitative methodology, resorts 
to abductive reasoning, and hence does not follow the common quantitative research (i.e. R 
methodology) framework of 1) proposing a theory, 2) deriving hypotheses (in a deductive manner), 
and then 3) testing them with group averages. In other words, Q study seeks to make discoveries 
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rather than making predictions.58 Since Q methodology is primarily concerned with generating 
meaningful typologies, it reveals qualitative segments (as opposed to quantitative) that exist in a 
population by doing so. As generating a meaningful perceptual framework is the priority in this 
study and since the methodology differs significantly from R methodology (e.g. content analysis, 
experiment, survey, and so forth), I do not present a typical R methodology-style set of hypotheses 
in this study. Therefore, I have no proposition other than the below research questions and 
hypotheses with regard to how RIGOs in South Korea are construed by relevant inside experts. 
Research questions of this study are concerned with the perception (or attitude) of South Korean 
local government officials toward RIGOs. As such, the first research question I address and the 
first hypothesis I propose are as follow: 
 
Research Question 1: Do South Korean local government officials share the same pattern of  
perception (or attitude) toward RIGOs? 
H1: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their  




58 This strategic choice is inevitable, because of the lack of existing empirical evidence (especially in a format usable 
for a quantitative research) available in the field of regionalism studies. Therefore, it is a challenge to frame this 
research in a traditional R methodology format in which there is a hypothesized causal loop explaining the behavior 
of a system by illustrating a collection of variables and nodes connecting them. For instance, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is not a single study examining the performance of RIGOs, which can be operationalized as a major 
variable for quantitative research. 
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 As it is most likely that there would be diverse patterns of thoughts and attitudes among 
South Korean local government officials about RIGOs, it is equally likely that H1 be rejected. Such 
a likelihood of the first hypothesis rejection leads to the question of what factors potentially exist 
that have impact on those South Korean local government officials’ different patterns of perception 
and attitude toward RIGOs. The findings emerged from the case study of RIGOs in South Korea 
(as summarized in 3.3) suggest that there are significant variations in organizational characteristics 
among the South Korean RIGOs in terms of variations in population size (minimum = 73,367; 
maximum = 5,526,262), regional dispersion, number of member local governments, and year of 
the foundation. However, there is not a significant variation in a set of policy and programs that 
the South Korean RIGOs are engaged in (minimum = 3.0; maximum = 5.0) especially vis-à-vis 
the United States RIGOs (minimum = 3.0; maximum = 7.0).59 Therefore, I hypothesize that South 
Korean local government officials demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) 
toward RIGOs that are contingent upon the above-mentioned variations. To be more specific, I 
address and propose the below sets of research questions and hypotheses that account for the 
above-mentioned variations.  
First, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO 
officials that are subjected to the variation in RIGO population size because of the following three 
reasons. First, ceteris paribus, the greater the population living within a RIGO, the more likely a 
RIGO would be involved in managing tasks that are either more diverse or more complex or both. 
Second, evidence from a large body of the management literature (especially the decision-making 
and goal-setting research literature) informs us that the degree to which tasks are complex has 
 
59 See Miller et al. (2019: 97) for a detailed account of the variation in the number of policy and program areas that 
the United States RIGOs provide. 
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impact on task-doers’ cognitive and motivational processes (Campbell, 1988). Third, as several 
scholars argue (e.g. Rickabaugh, 2020), population differences have a significant role in 
determining how regional organization identity is shaped and integration mechanisms are forged. 
Thus, as to the variation in population size, I address and propose the following research question 
and hypothesis: 
 
Research Question 2: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties  
related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of 
perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the variation 
in RIGO population size? 
 H2: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their 
respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward 
RIGOs that are contingent on the variation in RIGO population size. 
 
Second, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO 
officials that are subjected to the regional variation of RIGOs because of the metropolitan RIGO / 
rural RIGO divide. Although regional organizations outside of the metropolitan context have been 
rarely discussed in the urban studies literature and hence some scholars describe regional 
organizations serving rural local governments as “forgotten” (Hall, 2008), a few studies (e.g. 
Rickabaugh, 2020) suggest that rural RIGOs may be significantly different from their urban 
counterparts. For example, the former may emphasize different policies and programs. Therefore, 
the regional variation of South Korea, which is closely correlated with the rate of urbanization, is 
likely to have impact on how local governments forge their regional governance strategy. Thus, as 
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to the regional variation of RIGOs, I address and propose the following research question and 
hypothesis: 
 
Research Question 3: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties  
related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of 
perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the regional 
variation? 
 H3: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their 
respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward 
RIGOs that are contingent on the regional variation. 
 
Third, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO 
officials that are subjected to the number of member local governments because of decision-
making costs associated with it. As discussed earlier in the literature review, complexity (and thus 
decision-making costs) rises when the number of actors increase (Feiock, 2013; Olson, 1965; 
Provan and Kenis, 2008; Tavares and Feiock, 2018). Thus, as to the variation in the number of 
member local governments that have joined RIGOs, I address and propose the following research 
question and hypothesis: 
 
Research Question 4: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties  
related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of 
perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the number 
of member local governments? 
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 H4: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their 
respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward 
RIGOs that are contingent on the number of member local governments. 
 
Last, I hypothesize that there exist perceptual differences among South Korean RIGO 
officials that are subjected to the historical variation of RIGOs. Many scholars (e.g. Hulst and van 
Monfort, 2007; Tavares and Feiock, 2018) demonstrate that not only cultural and institutional 
differences but also historical variations play an important role in how different modes of self-
governance are organized and exercised. Thus, as to the historical variation, I address and propose 
the following research question and hypothesis: 
 
Research Question 5: Do South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties  
related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of 
perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the historical 
variation in terms of year of the foundation? 
 H5: South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their 
respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward 
RIGOs that are contingent on the historical variation in terms of year of the foundation. 
 
 In sum, I expect that there is not a single but multiple patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) 
toward RIGOs that the South Korean local government officials who work for RIGOs exhibit, and 
such a multiplicity is attributable to the variation in RIGO population size, region, number of 
member governments, and history. Furthermore, I expect that an analysis of each pattern’s 
72 
perspective on RIGOs that involves additional examinations, characterizations, and interpretations 
of each pattern as well as comparison between different patterns add to our understanding of the 
cognitive architecture underlying the expert perception of RIGOs in South Korea. 
4.2 Research Design 
As repeatedly mentioned thus far, I use Q methodology, a methodology of which the main 
strength is “its affinity to theory” (Kerlinger, 1986: 517), as it “provides a foundation for the 
systematic study of subjectivity” (Brown, 1991; see also Brown, 1980) and “intersubjectivity” 
(Nederhand et al., 2019: 235). Since the purpose of this study is to better understand how South 
Korean local government officials perceive the current practice, future prospects, and potential 
avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments 
that they work for, especially in terms of their patterns of attitude toward RIGOs, I utilize Q 
methodology first to identify those patterns. Then, I conduct further analysis to better understand 
the revealed patterns. 
 There are several steps involved to conducting Q methodology-based analysis. First, to 
construct the so-called “concourse,” I collect statements concerning RIGOs from the extant 
literature as well as interviews. Second, from the concourse, I extract the Q sample set by selecting 
the most relevant and representative statements from the concourse. Third, South Korean local 
government officials who perform essential duties related to RIGOs are invited to participate in 
this research. Fourth, I analyze the Q sorting by using Ken-Q Analysis (version 1.0.6), which is a 
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freely available web-based software specifically designed to conduct Q analysis.60 Last, the results 
of Q analysis that reveal the patterns of attitude toward RIGOs are then interpreted, further 
analyzed, and compared to gain additional insights on how RIGOs are perceived in South Korea. 
In the following subsections, I provide additional details on each aforementioned step. 
4.2.1 Concourse, Q Set, Q Distribution, and Pilot Study 
There are two different approaches to applying Q methodology to research activities: 
intensive individual studies and population studies.61 In this study, I apply population studies. In 
simplified terms, the very first step of Q methodology involves researchers to “develop knowledge 
about the breadth of the debate” (Molenveld, 2020: 5) and “capture the diversity of the debate” 
(Nederhand et al., 2019: 238; see also Watts and Stenner, 2012) of an issue, which is termed as 
‘concourse.’ A more refined definition of concourse is “a hypothetical concept that conveys the 
infinite set of possible expressions” that refer to an issue of concern, “from all different points of 
view” (Zabala and Pascual, 2016: 3). As to establishing the breath of the debate (i.e. concourse), 
researchers can use interviews, mass media, focus groups, policy reports, and academic discourses 
(Brown, 1991; Nederhand et al., 2019). In this research, I take the academic discourse as a starting 
point (see Durning and Osuna, 1994; Nederhand et al., 2019; Klijn et al., 2016). One benefit of 
this approach is that researchers can relate the empirical findings of their studies to existing 
 
60 For further details, see https://shawnbanasick.github.io/ken-q-analysis/. 
61 Molenveld (2020: 4) categorizes Q studies into two types, which are intensive individual studies and population 
studies. The former refers to studies that reveal “how a person thinks about different constructs” whereas the latter 
refers to studies focusing on “a larger group (i.e. given population)” and on “significant differences between 
respondents in a sample of the population.” 
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theoretical debates (Nederhand et al., 2019). I first document an extensive list of statements from 
the extant literature on regionalism (with specific regard to RIGOs) around the five properties 
identified by Miller and his colleagues (2019) to construct the concourse, and then extract sample 
statements that are most representative of and relevant to RIGOs (Molenveld, 2020; see also 
Webler et al., 2001). In so doing, I follow the statement-sampling method used by Dryzek and 
Berejikian (1993; see also Molenveld, 2020 and Nederhand et al., 2019)62 and I take precautions 
to maximize the parsimony of the statements while guaranteeing the diversity of the debate at the 
same time. Initially, there are seventy-two statements collected and documented that represent the 
concourse, which are reduced to thirty-six statements that are used as the actual Q-set (a proxy of 
the concourse) of this study. 
The second step of Q study involves researchers to formulate a factorial design.63 I design 
the factorial matrix of this research based on the five properties of RIGOs identified by Miller and 
his colleagues (2019): membership, agenda, legitimacy, ambition, and scale. Each statement is 
inspired by one of the five properties. Across the vertical axis, the matrix considers two types of 
statements: retrospective and prospective. Across the horizontal axis, the matrix considers five 
types of statements corresponding to the five properties of RIGOs. For the purpose of ensuring a 
balanced sample, I retain at least four statements in each cell especially for the prospective 
perception of RIGOs. Since the primary purpose of this dissertation study is to examine South 
Korean RIGO officials’ prospective views on improving their organizational practice (e.g. 
 
62 Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) first create a deductively informed matrix and then cluster inductively gathered 
statements (see also Molenveld, 2020: 9).  
63 To the best of my knowledge, McKeown and Thomas (1988; 2013) have coined the term ‘factorial design’ to refer 
to a list of Q statements clustered by themes. 
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improvement in technical efficiency and institutional arrangements), I include a relatively smaller 
number of statements for the retrospective evaluation of RIGOs. The below table is a visual 
representation of the factorial design reflective of the five properties. To ensure the reliability and 
the validity of the factorial matrix, I have consulted a number of professionals and scholars, 
including David Miller who, in collaboration with his colleagues, has proposed the RIGO 
framework. Especially, David Miller’s feedback has been most helpful in making significant 
adjustments and refinements of the final Q-set of the study. Also, although strictly not a pilot test, 
a Chinese master’s student at University of Pittsburgh majoring in Urban Affairs has conducted Q 
study on Chinese public officials using the same Q-set as the one used in this study to further 
validate the reliability and the applicability (see Zhang, 2020). 
 
Table 12. Factorial Design of the Q Study 
 
 
 As to the third step, although not absolutely necessary, Q statements are usually sorted into 
a normal or a quasi-normal distribution of preference (a Q sort), with the assumption that there are 
fewer statements that are either most agreeable or most disagreeable (Zabala and Pascual, 2016: 
3).64 In this study, I follow the conventional wisdom and use a forced distribution that takes the 
 
64  On Q distributions, Kerlinger (1986: 516-517) argues that “(t)he normal or quasi-normal distribution has 
advantages, mainly statistical, that make its use desirable” while Watts and Stenner (2012; see also Molenveld, 2020) 
advise that, if the respondents are knowledgeable about the issue, then it would be desirable for the researcher(s) to 
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shape of a quasi-normal distribution. That is, I use a scale from -5 (most disagreeable) to 5 (most 
agreeable) with the statements’ distribution from the far-left column to the far-right having values 
in the order of 1-2-3-4-5-6-5-4-3-2-1 (see Appendix F for the shape of the response grid). 
4.2.2 Participant Selection and Q-Sort 
With regard to selecting participants and administering Q-sorts, which is the fourth step of 
Q study, I first define the unit of analysis. In this study, the unit of analysis is an individual South 
Korean local government official who works for a RIGO and thus the population of the study 
consists of all local government officials who work for their respective RIGOs in South Korea.65 
Although there is a general consensus among Q scholars that samples of between twenty-five and 
forty are sufficient (Brown, 1980; Nederhand et al., 2019; Watts and Stenner, 2012), a total of 
forty-one South Korean local government officials who work for their respective RIGOs were 
recruited for participation (the P set of this study). From November 2019 to March 2020, I made 
phone calls to South Korean local government officials and asked if they would be willing to 
participate in the study. When they consented to participate in the study, I sent them an online Q-
 
make the distribution more flat. A flatter distribution allows the respondents to place more statements in the more 
agreeable / disagreeable columns, reflecting that there are less statements on which the respondents have neutral views. 
65  The reason I selected local government administrators as the participants of this study was because, to best 
understand South Korea’s intergovernmental relations as well as multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration, “the most 
important variable to consider” is bureaucrats (Im, 2003: 90) since they are de facto power brokers. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, regarding intergovernmental relations (and multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration) in South Korea, what 
should be of academic interests are relationships among and perceptions of career officials who govern in their official 
and unofficial capacities. 
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sort link.66 They responded to interviews by answering one demographic question (i.e. job rank)67 
and completing Q-sorting (online) and a brief follow-up interview session (by phone). All 
interviews were conducted in Korean and confidentiality was assured. 
Initially, I aimed for a larger P set with the hope that a non-probability, referral sampling 
that “involves identifying individuals who meet inclusion criteria, gaining their cooperation, and 
then asking them to recruit additional respondents with the same conditions” (Hogan et al., 2009; 
see also Heckathorn, 2002) would be feasible. However, due to a large number of South Korean 
local government officials’ reluctance to participate and inability to understand either the purpose 
of the study or how to complete the Q sort, the final count of forty-five participants completed the 
Q sort (of which four perfunctory Q-sorts were discarded). Among the forty-one mid-level and 
lower-level officials who work for eighteen RIGOs, fourteen officials work for four RIGOs in 
Seoul; four for one RIGO in Incheon; one for one RIGO in Daejeon; eight for two RIGOs in 
Gyeonggi; six for five RIGOs in Chungcheongnam; three for three RIGOs in Jeollabuk; two for 
two RIGOs in Gyeongsangnam; and three for two RIGOs in Gyeongsangbuk. As for the other 
 
66  I decided to administer this study online given the size of the P set and I used Q Method Software 
(https://qmethodsoftware.com/) as the online platform for Q sorting. 
67 As Kennedy (2013: 804) notes, “due to the inductive, explorative nature” and typically “small sample size” of Q 
studies, it is hardly likely that “statistical inferences or projections can be made” from the Q results “to the actual 
percentages of individuals in the general population with these particular worldviews.” Nonetheless, many scholars 
report their study participants’ demographic characteristics to “highlight interesting patterns and suggest the 
possibility of questions worthy of further study.” I attempted to do the same by including approximately ten 
demographic questions in the questionnaire, but such an attempt only resulted in further discouraging the South Korean 
local government officials from participating in the study. After a few unsuccessful attempts, I discarded all the 
demographic questions except job rank. 
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details of the characteristics of the respondents, the below Table 13 illustrates the makeup of the 
South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs in terms of job rank and 
organizational characteristics of RIGOs they work for. 
 




4.2.3 Data Analysis 
As to the final step of Q study, I use Ken-Q Analysis,68 a web-based computer software, 
for the data entry and analysis. In Q methodology, an analysis involves factor extraction, rotation, 
and interpretation (Flurey et al., 2014). As such, I first create a 41 by 41 matrix by correlating the 
Q-sorts of the research participants. Such a preliminary correlation analysis is, per Q scholars (e.g. 
Brown, 1980; Schmolck and Atkinson, 2013; Zabala and Pascual, 2016)’ suggestions, followed 
by a factor analysis that I conduct to reduce the data to a few summarizing factors. I conduct 
principal components analysis (PCA)69 for factor extraction and varimax rotation for sharpening 
of the factor structure.70 I elaborate further in chapter five on how the results of Q analysis that 
reveal the patterns of attitude toward RIGOs are interpreted and compared. 
 
 
68 https://shawnbanasick.github.io/ken-q-analysis/  
69 According to Zabala and Pascual (2016: 3), as opposed to PCA, centroid factor analysis is “a rare form of factor 
analysis, used exclusively in Q methodology. Also, as Ramlo (2016) notes, “most Q methodologists today use the 
more “modern” factor analytical choices of PCA.” 
70 As opposed to judgmental (or theoretical) rotation, varimax rotation produces a simple structure and thus is accepted 
as the best rotation technique (Ramlo, 2016; see also Rummel, 1970; Zabala and Pascual, 2016). Also, Ho (2006) 
elaborates that varimax rotation has gained popularity because of its ability to maximize the separation of factors and 
provide the clearest and simplest (or as Zabala and Pascula (2016: 5) terms, “mathematically optimal”) structure. 
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4.3 Selection of Q Statements 
In this section, I discuss how I extract the Q set used for this study from the concourse. I 
rely on the extant literature as reviewed in chapter two and three to construct the concourse of this 
study. In the sample statement selection process, I interview and consult with David Miller, one 
of the RIGO framework creators, for his advice. The selected thirty-six statements are then 
assigned to the ten categories as defined in the factorial design (see Table 12). 
4.3.1 Membership 
As government-centric as Miller and his colleagues are in their understanding of RIGOs, 
they also appreciate that participation by civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business 
interests) as well as different tiers of government in RIGOs “represents an important innovation” 
in regional governance (Miller et al., 2019: 87). In addition, there have always been issues of how 
decision-making rights of and financial contributions to RIGOs should be distributed between 
local governments. As such, the following Q statements are selected to reflect the most salient 
thoughts on the membership property of RIGOs. 
 
15 
Our organization should be primarily constituted by general-purpose local 
governments. 
13 
The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) 
represented within our organization, the more accountable it will be. 
23 
Our organization should give each member the same voting weight when making 
decisions. 
9 
The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) 
represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be. 
6 Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions. 
36 
Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by 
national / provincial agencies on our board. 
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30 
The more there are other government entities (e.g. national agencies and provincial 
departments) represented within our organization, the more accountable it will be. 
26 
Each general-purpose local government member should provide financial support to 
our organization in relation to their relative population. 
22 
The more there are other government entities (e.g. national agencies and provincial 
departments) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it 
will be. 
28 
Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by civic 
sector organizations on our board. 
 
4.3.2 Agenda 
There is an ongoing discussion as to whether RIGOs’ policy and program domains should 
be as broad or narrow as possible. Also, whether RIGOs should pursue a competitive advantage 
by promoting strategic policy niche management is another issue. The following Q statements 
reflect the competing views on the policy-broadening/narrowing debate as well as on the necessity 
of policy niche management. 
 
4 Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas. 
19 
There are certain policy areas (or policy niches) that only our organization can 
tackle. 
5 
The fewer the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more 
effective it will be. 
27 
The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more 
effective it will be. 
18 Having a broad agenda is better than having a narrow agenda. 
33 
Our role should be more focused on planning than on delivering programs and 
services. 
24 





Definition-wise, a RIGO must be seen as “the primary representative of the region’s 
governments and their collective interests” (Miller et al., 2019: 87). However, as to which tiers of 
government and which types of national agencies / provincial departments matter to RIGOs 
remains a crucial question. As such, the following Q statements, generated based on Lowi (1964)’s 
typology of public policy in the United States, concern RIGOs’ legitimacy as viewed by different 
tiers and types of government. 
 
29 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by national government law enforcement agencies. 
17 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by national government transportation agencies. 
25 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by national government health, education, and welfare agencies. 
2 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by national government budgeting or personnel agencies. 
8 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by provincial government law enforcement agencies. 
14 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by provincial government transportation agencies. 
16 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by provincial government health, education, and welfare agencies. 
31 
Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as 
viewed by provincial government budgeting or personnel agencies. 
 
4.3.4 Ambition 
Ambition is a concept that captures the extent to which RIGOs intend to represent their 
regions. The below Q statements are reflective of RIGOs’ efforts to “identify, articulate, negotiate, 
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decide, or implement regional solutions to area-wide problems” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 345), 
including forging partnerships with other local / regional players. 
 
1 
Our organization should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, 
including with our neighboring regions and across provincial lines when appropriate. 
12 
Our organization should take a leadership role and strive to be a primary player in regional 
economic development issues. 
21 
Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit 
and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming 
traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services. 
32 
Our organization has modified our culture over the years to continue serving local 
governments, yet also broadened our partnerships and relationships with private, nonprofit, 
philanthropic and academic institutions. 
3 
Our organization is focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region 
to remain competitive. 
34 




Scale is a property concerned with whether RIGOs are, or should be, large enough to be 
representative and to address policy problems common to a set of member local governments. 
Therefore, this property involves issues of defining regions / clusters of cities and counties. As 
such, the following Q statements reflects thoughts on the territorial issues of RIGOs. 
 
35 
Our organization actively promotes the mission of multi‐jurisdictional collaboration 
among local governments within a clearly defined region. 
7 Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our region. 
20 
If there were fewer members in our organization, we would be better able to perform 
our function. 
10 
Our organization should help governments in sub-regions of our region deal with issues 
unique to those sub-regions. 
11 
Our organization should review significant regional economic development plans that 
are proposed for our region. 
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4.3.6 Summary 
As above, for the construction of the Q set of this study, I select the total of thirty-six 
sample statements with the aim of capturing “the diversity and complexity of the different views 
contained within the concourse” (Brown et al., 2008: 723): ten prospective “membership” 
statements; one retrospective and six prospective “agenda” statements; eight prospective 
“legitimacy” statements; two retrospective and four prospective “ambition” statements; and one 
retrospective and four prospective “scale” statements are included in the set. By so doing, this 
research design satisfies the Q methodological requirement that “the sample must include enough 
statements to fully represent the diversity of the concourse, but must not have so many statements 






5.0 Research Findings 
Chapter five contains five sections. The first section reports the analysis results of factor 
extraction, rotation, and interpretation of this study. In the second section, I present an 
interpretation of the factors in relation to Miller and Nelles’ identification of RIGOs and build 
profiles of the factors (patterns). In section three, I identify statements scored similarly across all 
factors, which are therefore considered to have reached consensus. Section four evaluates the 
hypotheses of this research in relation to the factors elicited. In the last section, based on the factor 
profiles, I evaluate the revealed perceptual and attitudinal similarities and differences among South 
Korean local government officials with regard to their experience and view on the current practice, 
future prospects, and potential avenues for development of the RIGOs in South Korea. 
5.1 Analysis and Interpretation 
As briefly described in chapter 4, I first correlated the Q-sort of the research participants, 
creating a 41 by 41 matrix. I then conducted principal component analysis (PCA) to extract factors 
from the data. I carefully reviewed the unrotated factor matrix and determined how many factors 
would be retained for rotation. A significant factor loading at .01 level was calculated using the 
formula (1/√n)*2.58  or  (1/√n)*(-2.58), where n is the number of Q statements used in this study. 
In this study, the total of thirty-six statements were used. Thus, respondents with factor loadings 
of ± .43 were accepted as having loaded on a factor and they were sorted into a factor group. For 
factor extraction, I first evaluated factors with an eigenvalue greater than unity. The below Table 
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15 is a line plot of the eigen values (>1) of the eight unrotated factors (scree plot)71 and the below 
Table 14 summarizes the respective eigenvalues and the percent of variance explained by each 
factor group as well as the cumulative percent explained variance of the eight factors. 
 
 
Figure 4. Scree Plot  
 
71 See Appendix G for the full unrotated factor matrix. 
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Table 14. Summary of the Eight Factors 
 
 
I carefully reviewed the eight factors’ eigenvalues, percent explain variance, and 
cumulative percent explained variance. Also, I reviewed another important criterion, which is 
whether each factor has a reasonable number of participants loaded on them,72 to make a better-
informed judgment on which factors would be retained. After the review process, I decided to 
retain four factors for varimax rotation. After conducting varimax rotation, I derived a four-factor 
solution, and the result is reported as below in Table 15, which is a factor matrix (i.e. factor 
loadings) with defining sorts flagged.73 The factor loading for each Q-sort is indicative of its 
correlation with each factor. With the four-factor solution, thirty-six out of forty-one participants 
loaded on one of the four factors, resulting in five (this is explained further in the next section of 
this chapter) distinct viewpoints of RIGOs. Table 16 summarizes the factor characteristics.  
 
72 According to Watts and Stenner (2012), the two conditions that researchers should consider in retaining factors are 
whether the factors’ eigenvalues exceed one and whether two or more Q-sorts load significantly on each factor. 
73 See Appendix H for the correlations between factor scores. 
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Table 15. Factor Matrix with Defining Sorts Flagged 














0.0276  0.1165  0.4802 flagged 
2 Par2 
-
0.2796  0.1099  
-
0.1054  0.6844 flagged 
3 Par3 0.0482  0.1229  
-
0.1513  0.6761 flagged 
4 Par4 -0.02  
-







0.0371  0.5712 flagged 
6 Par6 0.1397  
-
0.1542  0.7477 flagged 0.1391  
7 Par7 0.4935  0.1827  0.4128  
-
0.2608  
8 Par8 0.1113  0.1839  0.4897  
-
0.5526 flagged 
9 Par9 0.1287  0.6276 flagged 0.1901  -0.046  
10 Par10 
-
0.0227  0.1841  0.0374  0.3396  
11 Par11 -0.02  0.4963 flagged 0.3659  0.0638  





0.1343  0.7853 flagged 
-














0.1019  0.4781 flagged 0.1565  

















0.0444  0.5157 flagged 
-
0.3368  0.009  
20 Par20 0.187  
-
0.4993  0.6519 flagged 0.2317  





22 Par22 0.6267 flagged 0.2839  0.0546  
-
0.1557  
23 Par23 0.2076  0.2479  
-
0.0937  0.1236  
24 Par24 0.6766 flagged 
-
0.0767  0.1583  0.3033  
25 Par25 0.7752 flagged 
-
0.2528  0.0027  
-
0.1931  














0.0787  0.5127  










0.0722  0.0621  







0.7214 flagged -0.124  0.1767  0.4814  
33 Par33 
-
0.8095 flagged 0.0388  0.1154  0.4516  
34 Par34 
-
0.7658 flagged 0.05  0.0608  0.4789  









0.1421  0.1196  0.5218  
37 Par37 
-
0.2687  0.0626  0.4668  0.5557 flagged 
38 Par38 
-
0.1126  0.0713  0.1774  0.7204 flagged 
39 Par39 0.5344 flagged 0.2265  0.1801  0.1008  
40 Par40 0.7447 flagged 0.1886  0.0772  0.1467  






variance 23  10  9  13  
 
Table 16. Factor Characteristics 
 
After the completion of factor extraction and factor rotation, I analyzed each factor group 
to interpret its meaning. In Q methodology, factors are interpreted based on a model Q-sort for 
each factor that is revealed. The model Q-sort, alternatively termed as factor array, can be 
constructed by merging the individual participants’ significant sort loadings. The degrees to which 
the individual participants’ significant sorts are loaded on factors are indicative of the fact that 
some Q-sorts are more closely associated with the perspective of the factor than other Q-sorts. 
Therefore, I first computed factor weights, and then using the factor weights and raw data of 
90 
individual participants, I merged individual Q-sorts to produce factor scores. The below Table 17 
presents the four model Q-sorts. 
 
Table 17. Factor Scores 
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1 -3 4 2 4 
2 0 2 0 3 
3 -4 0 3 4 
4 5 3 -2 2 
5 -1 3 -2 2 
6 -1 4 3 -4 
7 -1 1 -5 -2 
8 0 2 0 -1 
9 3 5 -4 -2 
10 -1 0 -1 -3 
11 -3 0 -4 -1 
12 0 1 -3 -2 
13 3 2 -1 1 
14 1 1 -3 0 
15 -2 2 0 1 
16 0 1 2 0 
17 0 0 -1 -1 
18 4 1 4 -2 
19 1 0 -2 0 
20 -2 -1 1 1 
21 -5 -1 2 3 
22 1 -1 -2 1 
23 0 -2 4 -4 
24 -3 -1 0 3 
25 2 0 -1 -1 
26 -1 -1 0 -3 
27 1 -2 5 -5 
28 3 3 3 -3 
29 2 -3 1 0 
30 -2 -2 -1 -1 
31 2 -2 1 2 
32 4 -4 -3 0 
33 -2 -3 1 2 
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34 -4 -5 0 5 
35 1 -4 1 1 
36 2 -3 2 0 
5.2 Five Factor Groups 
In the first four subsections, I report the findings from the abovementioned factor analysis. 
In so doing, I provide a description of each pattern (or factor group)’s arrangements of the 
statements in terms of their most agreed (+5) and most disagreed statements (-5) as well as positive 
and negative distinguishing statements. Distinguishing statements refer to those statements of 
which the absolute differences between factor z-scores are larger than the standard error (S.E.) of 
difference for a given pair of factors (significant at p <.01) (Vorm and Miller, 2018). 
5.2.1 Factor Group One and Factor Group One-: Agenda-Broadening and Agenda-
Narrowing 
Factor group one (pattern one) is defined by ten participants and factor group one- (pattern 
one-) by five participants. That is, of the fifteen participants who load significantly on this factor, 
ten load positively and five load negatively. Therefore, this is a bipolar factor, which can be 
understood as there being two exact opposite perspectives expressed and hence each have a factor 
array “that is the mirror-image of the other” (Flurey et al., 2014). Factor group one and one- 
together explain twenty-nine percent of the study with an eigenvalue of 11.91. 
 The highest ranked statement of this factor group is “Our organization should have an 
agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas” whereas the lowest ranked statement of this 
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factor group is “Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, 
nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming 
traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services.” The other positive 
distinguishing statement for factor group one is “Our organization has modified our culture over 
the years to continue serving local governments, yet also broadened our partnerships and 
relationships with private, nonprofit, philanthropic and academic institutions.” Other negative 
distinguishing statements for factor group one are (in ascending order): “Our organization is 
focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to remain competitive”; 
“Our organization should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional boundaries, 
including with our neighboring regions and across state/provincial lines when appropriate”; and 
“Our organization should be primarily constituted by general-purpose local governments.”  
Individuals positively loading on this factor (factor group one) strongly believe that their 
respective organizations should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas. 
However, they do not seem enthusiastic about representing the region or fostering regional 
collaboration among various actors within the region or providing the leadership and vision 
necessary for the region to remain competitive. Membership-wise, they tend to be less 
government-centric as they disagree with the statement that their organization should remain 
primarily local government membership-based. On the other hand, individuals negatively loading 
on this factor (factor group one-) hold the exact viewpoint: they strongly doubt that their respective 
organizations should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas but they are 
willing to be a voice of the region in the broader provincial and national community. Membership-
wise, they prefer that their organizations maintain the dominance of local government members. 
Based on the interpretation of the highest and lowest ranked statements as well as the 
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distinguishing statements, I label factor group one as “agenda-broadening” and factor group one- 
as “agenda-narrowing.” The below Figure 5 is a graphic summary of composite Q sort for factor 













Figure 5. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group One (Pattern One) 
5.2.2 Factor Group Two: Membership-Expanding 
Factor group two (pattern two) is defined by seven participants and explains ten percent of 
the study with an eigenvalue of 3.90. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is “The 
more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within 
our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be,” whereas the lowest ranked statement 
of this factor group is “Our organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its 
constituent local governments.” The other positive distinguishing statement for factor group two 
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is: “Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions.” The other 
negative distinguishing statement for factor group two is “Our organization actively promotes the 
mission of multi‐jurisdictional collaboration among local governments within a clearly defined 
region.”; and “Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active participation by 
national and/or provincial agencies on our board.” One of the two second lowest ranked statement 
is “Our organization has modified our culture over the years to continue serving local governments, 
yet also broadened our partnerships and relationships with private, nonprofit, philanthropic and 
academic institutions.” The view emerging is that of an individual who welcomes the recent 
phenomenon of civic sector organizations increasingly taking significant roles in his/her RIGO, 
believing that those nonprofits and business interests’ participation would make the organization 
more effective and efficient. However, these individuals are as reluctant as those loading on factor 
group one- in terms of their intent to represent their regions. Agenda-wise, they seem moderate as 
they do not either want to broaden or narrow their policy agenda. Thus, I label factor group two as 
“membership-expanding.” The below Figure 6 is a graphic summary of composite Q sort for factor 




Figure 6. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Two (Pattern Two) 
5.2.3 Factor Group Three: Equality-Promoting 
Factor group three (pattern three) is defined by five participants and explains nine percent 
of the study with an eigenvalue of 3.78. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is “The 
more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be”; the 
second highest ranked statement of this factor group, which is also a positive statement ranked 
higher in factor group three than in other factor arrays, is “Our organization should give each 
member the same voting weight when making decisions”; and the lowest ranked statement of this 
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factor group is “Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our 
region.” The other negative distinguishing statement for factor group three is “The more there are 
civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our 
organization, the more effective and efficient it will be.” Individuals loading on this factor group 
are, membership-wise, egalitarian in decision-making but do not want to expand the membership 
basis of their organizations; agenda-wise, they believe that the greater the number of policy areas 
their RIGOs engage in, the more effective they will be; and, scale-wise, they do not prefer a 
territorial expansion. However, ambition-wise, their viewpoint is not coherent, and it seems as 
though they are confused. Thus, I label factor group three as “equality-promoting.” The below 




Figure 7. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Three (Pattern Three) 
5.2.4 Factor Group Four: Local Government-Centric 
Factor group four (pattern four) is defined by nine participants and explains nine percent 
of the study with an eigenvalue of 3.58. The highest ranked statement of this factor group is “Our 
organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments” 
and one of the two second highest “Our organization should work to foster collaboration across 
local jurisdictional boundaries, including with our neighboring regions and across state/provincial 
lines when appropriate,” whereas the lowest ranked statement of this factor group is “The more 
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the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be.” Positive 
statements ranked higher in factor group four than in other factor arrays are (in descending order): 
“Our organization is focused on providing the leadership and vision necessary for the region to 
remain competitive”; “Our organization should actively address emerging policy issues 
confronting our region”; and “Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration 
among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including 
overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services.” Negative 
statements ranked lower in factor group four than in other factor arrays are (in ascending order): 
“Poorer jurisdictions should not have to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions”; “Each general-
purpose local government member should provide financial support to our organization in relation 
to their relative population”; “Our organization would be more legitimate if there was active 
participation by civic sector organizations on our board”; and “Having a broad agenda is better 
than having a narrow agenda.” Individuals loading on this factor group are, membership-wise, 
those who believe that, with respect to each member’s financial contribution to the RIGO, even 
poor jurisdictions should be equally burdened; agenda-wise, they believe that the less the number 
of policy areas their RIGOs engage in, the better-off they will be; and, ambition-wise, they believe 
their respective organizations should work to foster collaboration across local jurisdictional 
boundaries, including with their neighboring regions and across provincial lines when appropriate, 
and that their utmost priority is to serve the interests of their constituent local governments. Thus, 
I label factor group four as “local government-centric.” The below Figure 8 is an illustration of 




Figure 8. Composite Q Sort for Factor Group Four (Pattern Four) 
5.2.5 Factor Group Profile Summary 
Agenda-broadening local government officials are individuals who rank “Our organization 
should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas” the highest and “Our 
organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and 
philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf 
battles and stove piping of programs and services” the lowest. In the meanwhile, agenda-narrowing 
local government officials are individuals who hold the exact opposite perspective (i.e. mirror 
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image) on RIGOs, and thus rank “Our organization should focus on fostering regional 
collaboration among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected 
officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove piping of programs and services” 
and “Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of policy areas” the 
lowest. In other words, regarding the former’s viewpoint on the agenda dimension, they are in 
favor of broadening their policy and program domains. Concerning their viewpoint on the ambition 
dimension, they tend to be antagonistic against, or at least reluctant to invest their efforts to 
collaborate with private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders as well as their political 
leadership in their regional problem solving including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove 
piping of programs and services. On the contrary, the latter, which are agenda-narrowing local 
government officials, are enthusiastic about regional collaboration to “identify, articulate, 
negotiate, decide, or implement regional solutions to area-wide problems” (Miller and Nelles, 2020: 
345) but prefer concentrating on a fewer number of policies and programs. With regard to the two 
factor groups’ perspectives on the membership dimension, the former tend to be more inclusive 
whereas the latter tend to be exclusive. That is, whereas the former are willing to invite non-
government actors as their partners, the latter desire to regain predominantly local government-
based. 
 Membership-expanding local government officials are individuals who rank “The more 
there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business interests) represented within our 
organization, the more effective and efficient it will be” the highest and “Our organization’s 
highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments” the lowest. 
This implies that, concerning the membership dimension, this group of individuals believe that, to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their RIGOs, they would not hesitate non-
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governmental actors such as nonprofits and business interests assuming a more important role 
within their organizations. Therefore, it is natural that, regarding the ambition dimension, they do 
not consider serving the interests of their member local governments as their utmost priority. On 
the issue of whether RIGOs should either broaden or narrow the scope and scale of their policy 
and program services, these individuals do not reveal any defining feature. 
 Equality-promoting local government officials, or egalitarians, are individuals who rank 
“The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the more effective it will be” 
the highest and “Our organization should be large enough to represent all the governments in our 
region” the lowest. This group of individuals stress the importance of equality in their decision-
making process as they rank “Our organization should give each member the same voting weight 
when making decisions” as the second most agreeable statement. However, on the scale dimension, 
they do not want their organizations to grow in terms of territorial size and population, and thus it 
seems as though they would want to deliver more services to a smaller territory and/or a smaller 
population of citizens. 
 Finally, local-government-centric local government officials, or perhaps egotists, are 
individuals who rank “Our organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its 
constituent local governments” the highest and “The more the number of policy areas our 
organization engages in, the more effective it will be” the lowest. In other words, concerning the 
ambition dimension, this group of individuals’ prime concerns are serving their member local 
governments, and agenda-wise, they believe that their organizational effectiveness would be 
enhanced when they reduce the number of policy areas they engage in. Membership-wise, they 
tend to apply strict policies regarding financial contribution that each member local government is 
expected to make. 
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 In this subsection, I thus far summarized the profiles of the five factor groups in terms of 
their relative rankings of statements. However, I have not yet discussed in depth the five factor 
groups’ perspectives on the scale dimension and the legitimacy dimension because, as opposed to 
the other three dimensions, the five factor groups have more commonalities than differences in 
their perceptions of how they should deal with territorial issues and legitimacy concerns. In the 
following section, I discuss major consensuses and disagreements among the five factor groups. 
In so doing, I also review the five factor groups’ viewpoints on the two remaining dimensions. The 
below Table 18 portrays relative rankings of statements by factor group. 
 
Table 18. Relative Rankings of Statements by Factor Group (Pattern) 
 Factor group 1: Agenda-broadening 
Highest 
Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of 
policy areas 
Lowest 
Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration 
among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local 
elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove 
piping of programs and services 
 Factor group 1-: Agenda-narrowing 
Highest 
Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration 
among private, nonprofit and philanthropic sector leaders with our local 
elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf battles and stove 
piping of programs and services 
Lowest 
Our organization should have an agenda that covers a broad number of 
policy areas 
 Factor group 2: Membership-expanding 
Highest 
The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and 
business interests) represented within our organization, the more 
effective and efficient it will be 
Lowest 
Our organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its 
constituent local governments 
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 Factor group 3: Equality-promoting 
Highest 
The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the 
more effective it will be 
Lowest 
Our organization should be large enough to represent all the 
governments in our region 
 Factor group 4: Local government-centric 
Highest 
Our organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its 
constituent local governments 
Lowest 
The more the number of policy areas our organization engages in, the 
more effective it will be 
5.3 Consensus vs. Disagreement among the Five Factor Groups 
In this subsection, I report further on the research findings by focusing on statements that 
either generated consensus or created disagreement in the study sample. I explore what statements 
the participants agree on (i.e. consensus) and what statements create a large amount of 
disagreement. Consensus statements are statements of which all participants appreciate the 
importance, as “indicated by a low Z-score variance” in their arrangements, whereas disagreement 
statements are statements that are polarized in terms of factor groups’ viewpoints, as “indicated by 
a high Z-score variance” in their arrangements (Vorm and Miller ,2018). 
The five statements that the study participants agree on the most are (in descending order): 
“Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by 
national government transportation agencies”; “The more there are other government entities (e.g. 
national agencies and provincial departments) represented within our organization, the more 
accountable it will be”; “Our organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental 
legitimacy as viewed by state/provincial government health, education, and welfare agencies”; 
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“There are certain policy areas (or policy niches) that only our organization can tackle”; and “Our 
organization should have a high degree of intergovernmental legitimacy as viewed by national 
government health, education, and welfare agencies.”74  
It is noteworthy that four out of the five statements are concerned with RIGOs’ 
relationships with national agencies and provincial governments. Also, three statements out of the 
top five statements are on legitimacy; and the remaining five “legitimacy” statements are also 
relatively agreeable statements, as indicated by a relatively moderate Z-score variance. The least 
agreeable “legitimacy” statement ranks the nineteenth out of the thirty-six statements. Based on 
the above findings, it can be inferred that local government officials have a shared sentiment of 
importance regarding vertical (or hierarchical) relations among different tiers of government. In 
addition, all five “scale” statements are relatively more agreeable statements, as indicated by low 
to moderate Z-score variances. This may be indicative of an existing consensus among the five 
factor groups on RIGOs’ “legitimacy” and “scale” dimensions. 
As to disagreement, the five statements that the study participants disagree the most are (in 
ascending order): “The more there are civic sector organizations (e.g. nonprofits and business 
interests) represented within our organization, the more effective and efficient it will be”; “Our 
organization’s highest priority should be to serve the interests of its constituent local governments”; 
“Our organization should focus on fostering regional collaboration among private, nonprofit and 
philanthropic sector leaders with our local elected officials, including overcoming traditional turf 
battles and stove piping of programs and services”; “The more the number of policy areas our 
organization engages in, the more effective it will be”; and “Poorer jurisdictions should not have 
to pay at the same rate as richer jurisdictions.” Among the five most disagreeable statements, two 
 
74 The top two statements, which are statement 17 and statement 30, are non-significant at p > 0.01. 
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are “membership” statements; two “ambition” statements; and one “agenda” statements. 
Extending the observation range to the eighteen most disagreeable statements, which are exactly 
half of this study’s Q-sample, all but two (one “scale” and the other “legitimacy” statement) are 
either “membership” or “agenda” or “ambition” statements. Thus, it can be inferred that there exist 
more diverse views and attitudes toward these three aspects of RIGOs than the other two. The 
below Table 19 presents consensus versus disagreement among the five factor groups (patterns). 
 














17 Legitimacy 0 0 -1 -1 0.048 
30 Membership -2 -2 -1 -1 0.056 
16 Legitimacy 0 1 2 0 0.09 
19 Agenda 1 0 -2 0 0.11 
25 Legitimacy 2 0 -1 -1 0.118 
22 Membership 1 -1 -2 1 0.134 
10 Scale -1 0 -1 -3 0.166 
8 Legitimacy 0 2 0 -1 0.169 
26 Membership -1 -1 0 -3 0.176 
20 Scale -2 -1 1 1 0.177 
2 Legitimacy 0 2 0 3 0.246 
31 Legitimacy 2 -2 1 2 0.286 
12 Ambition 0 1 -3 -2 0.303 
15 Ambition -2 2 0 1 0.331 
11 Scale -3 0 -4 -1 0.354 
33 Agenda -2 -3 1 2 0.357 
29 Legitimacy 2 -3 1 0 0.367 
35 Scale 1 -4 1 1 0.429 
14 Legitimacy 1 1 -3 0 0.452 
36 Membership 2 -3 2 0 0.472 
7 Scale -1 1 -5 -2 0.51 
5 Agenda -1 3 -2 2 0.573 
13 Membership 3 2 -1 1 0.646 
4 Agenda 5 3 -2 2 1.192 
18 Agenda 4 1 4 -2 1.308 
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28 Membership 3 3 3 -3 1.396 
1 Ambition -3 4 2 4 1.415 
24 Agenda -3 -1 0 3 1.43 
23 Membership 0 -2 4 -4 1.565 
3 Ambition -4 0 3 4 1.568 
32 Ambition 4 -4 -3 0 1.603 
6 Membership -1 4 3 -4 1.623 
27 Agenda 1 -2 5 -5 1.706 
21 Ambition -5 -1 2 3 1.989 
34 Ambition -4 -5 0 5 2.458 
9 Membership 3 5 -4 -2 2.593 
5.4 RIGO Characteristics and the Five Factor Groups 
In this section, whether South Korean local government officials (who work for their 
respective RIGOs)’ perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs are uniform is first examined. The Q 
analysis results of this study yield five factor groups: Ten participants load on the first factor group; 
five participants on the second factor group; seven participants on the third factor group; five 
participants on the fourth factor group; and nine participants on the fifth factor group. This is 
indicative of the existence of various types of perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs. Thus, I 
reject the first hypothesis (H1). That is, South Korean local government officials who perform 
essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate diverse patterns of perceptions (or 
attitudes) toward RIGOs. As such, in the following subsections, I further examine whether such a 
diversity of perceptions is attributable to significant variations in organizational characteristics 
existent among the South Korean RIGOs. 
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5.4.1 RIGO Population and the Five Factor Groups 
First of all, I examine whether RIGO population differences are related to the different 
patterns of thoughts and perceptions of South Korean local government officials who perform 
essential duties related to their respective RIGOs. As presented in the below Table 20, the analysis 
results are suggestive of there being a relationship between RIGO population size variations and 
different perceptions and attitudes toward RIGOs in South Korea. Therefore, H2, which is “South 
Korean local government officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs 
demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on 
the variation in RIGO population size” is accepted. 
 
Table 20. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and RIGO Population Size 
 
Factor group 1:  
Agenda-
broadening 
Factor group 1-:  
Agenda-
narrowing 
Factor group 2:  
Membership-
expanding 
Factor group 3:  
Equality-
promoting 






      
  Extra-large 13% 4% 29% 21% 33% 100% 
  Large 56% 33% 0% 0% 11% 100% 
  Medium 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
  Small 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Furthermore, the results suggest that participants working for RIGOs serving extra-large 
population of citizens do not load on factor group one- whereas factor group one and factor group 
one- are strongly associated with participants working for RIGOs serving smaller populations. 
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5.4.2 RIGO Location and the Five Factor Groups 
Second, I examine whether regional differences in terms of where RIGOs are located have 
any linkage to perceptual differences of the study participants. The analysis results as presented in 
the below Table 21 indicate that regional variations create perceptual differences of the study 
participants. Therefore, as to whether South Korean local government officials who perform 
essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or 
attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the regional variation, H3 is accepted. 
 
Table 21. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Regional Variation 
 
Factor group 1:  
Agenda-
broadening 
Factor group 1-:  
Agenda-
narrowing 
Factor group 2:  
Membership-
expanding 
Factor group 3:  
Equality-
promoting 




Region       
  Seoul 0% 0% 36% 9% 55% 100% 
  Incheon 0% 0% 0% 75% 25% 100% 
  Daejeon 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 
  Gyeonggi 43% 0% 43% 14% 0% 100% 
  
Chungcheongnam 
60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
  Jeollabuk 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
  Gyeongsangnam 0% 50% 0% 0% 50% 100% 
  Gyeongsangbuk 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Moreover, it is worthy of attention that the study participants who work for metropolitan RIGOs 
load on factor group two, three, and four only, whereas all participants but one who work for non-
metropolitan RIGOs load on factor group one and factor group one- only. 
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5.4.3 Number of RIGO Member Local Governments and the Five Factor Groups 
Third, I examine whether a difference in the number of local governments participating in 
RIGOs is associated with the five factor groups. The below Table 22 presents the analysis results 
in support of H4, which is “South Korean local government officials who perform essential duties 
related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) 
toward RIGOs that are contingent on the number of member local governments.” 
 
Table 22. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Number of Member Local Governments 
 
Factor group 1:  
Agenda-
broadening 
Factor group 1-:  
Agenda-
narrowing 
Factor group 2:  
Membership-
expanding 
Factor group 3:  
Equality-
promoting 




RIGO number of 
member 
governments 
      
  >10 10% 10% 20% 40% 20% 100% 
  5~10 27% 14% 23% 5% 32% 100% 
  <5 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Additionally, it is worth to note that, the greater the number of local governments RIGOs have as 
their members, the more likely it is that the study participants load on factor group two, three, and 
four. 
5.4.4 RIGO History and the Five Factor Groups 
Lastly, I examine whether RIGO history has any connection with how RIGOs are perceived 
by South Korean local government officials working for RIGOs. The below Table 23 is a 
presentation of the analysis results that support H5, which is “South Korean local government 
officials who perform essential duties related to their respective RIGOs demonstrate different 
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patterns of perceptions (or attitudes) toward RIGOs that are contingent on the historical variation 
in terms of year of the foundation.” 
 
Table 23. Distribution of Participants by Factor Groups and Year of RIGO Establishment 
 
Factor group 1:  
Agenda-
broadening 
Factor group 1-:  
Agenda-
narrowing 
Factor group 2:  
Membership-
expanding 
Factor group 3:  
Equality-
promoting 




RIGO year of 
establishment 
      
  1980s 50% 0% 33% 0% 17% 100% 
  1990s 11% 0% 22% 44% 22% 100% 
  2000s 0% 25% 25% 0% 50% 100% 
  2010s 63% 25% 0% 0% 13% 100% 
 
In the case of the relationship between the factor groups and RIGO history, it is observed that 
participants who work for relatively older RIGOs (i.e. RIGOs established in the 1980s) and 
relatively newer RIGOs (i.e. RIGOs established in the 2010s) load on factor group one (fifty 
percent and sixty-three percent respectively) whereas those who work for RIGOs founded in the 
1990s and the 2000s load on factor group three (forty-four percent) and four (fifty percent) 
respectively. 
5.4.5 Summary of the Relationship between RIGO Characteristics and the Five Factor 
Groups 
As demonstrated in this section, all but the first hypothesis are accepted as the Q-analysis 
results are in support of the relationship between some important organizational characteristics of 
RIGOs and the five factor groups. That is, it is evident that RIGOs’ organizational characteristics 
identified in this study are associated with how people who work for RIGOs perceive them. 
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Furthermore, the results present some interesting trends emerged during analysis. First, many study 
participants who work for RIGOs that either serve relatively smaller populations or are non-
metropolitan or have fewer member local governments or are relatively older or more recently 
founded load significantly on factor group one. That is, South Korean local government officials 
working for those RIGOs focus on broadening their policy agendas. However, they are not much 
interested in providing the leadership and vision necessary for their regions to remain competitive. 
Second, some study participants who work for RIGOs that serve relatively smaller populations 
load significantly on factor group one-. This has some potentially interesting implications as 
agenda-narrowing local government officials who want to concentrate on only a few numbers of 
policy agendas may feel that way on account of their resource availability and geographical 
disadvantages. Third, many study participants who work for RIGOs that either serve extra-large 
populations or are metropolitan or have many member local governments load significantly on 
factor group two, three, and four. In other words, South Korean local government officials who 
work for RIGOs serving relatively larger populations do not think of the policy agenda debate 
(broadening vs. narrowing) as importantly as others do. They consider other dimensions more 
importantly, and thus issues of whether they should expand their membership bases; or promote 
equality in decision-making or making financial contribution; or prioritize their core missions of 
serving the interests of their constituent local governments above and beyond other missions. Last, 
many study participants who work for RIGOs that are established in the 1990s or the 2000s load 
significantly on factor group three and four. This implies that some of the older and the newer 
RIGOs (e.g. those established in the 1990s or in the 2010s) consider the scope and scale of agendas 
more importantly than other dimensions. 
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As to how to interpret these findings, I take caution as the nature of the data collected and 
the method used in this study is less than ideal to make generalized comments on the above-
mentioned relationships between variables.75 I consider the findings reported in this section in 
particular only as contours of the relationships between variables. However, it should be noted that 
the purpose of this dissertation study is more exploratory than to make generalizations. 
5.5 Three-Dimensional Patterns of Attitudes toward RIGOs’ Membership, Agenda, and 
Ambition 
As reported in the previous section (5.3.) summarizing consensus and disagreement among 
the five factor groups, it is evident that there exists a consensus across all five factor groups on 
how RIGOs’ legitimacy and scale issues are understood whereas there exist moderate to high 
degrees of disagreement with regard to how agenda, membership, and ambition issues are viewed. 
Furthermore, additional findings on the relationship between some of RIGO characteristics and 
the five factor groups inform that there exist significant differences among the study participants 
in terms of how they load on the five factor groups. Thus, based on the below Table 24 
summarizing the findings of the previous four sections of this chapter, I propose a framework (as 
presented in the below Figure 9) in which the five factor groups are converted into vectors having 
certain magnitudes and directions (or three-dimensional patterns of attitudes) that are reflective of 
 
75 Although it would be ideal to conduct statistical analysis of frequencies (e.g. Chi-squared test) to examine whether 
two categorical variables are associated, like many other Q studies, the number of participants in this study are not 
large enough to satisfy the general rule that “the expected value for each cell should be great than five” (), and thus, 
further efforts are needed to confirm the validity of the findings reported in this section. 
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where the five factor groups’ perspectives on the agenda, membership, and ambition dimensions 
are positioned relative to others in a three-dimensional space. Therefore, the Figure depicts the 
variations of the five different viewpoints along three intersecting continua and where each 
viewpoint is situated along each variable. Agenda-broadening officials, agenda-narrowing 
officials, membership-expanding officials, equality-promoting officials, and local-government-
centric officials demonstrate that there exists a significant variation along the three key dimensions 
of how RIGOs are perceived. Each of the viewpoints reflects there being a different combination 
of each of the three dimensions of RIGOs. Therefore, with regard to the three key dimensions, at 
least five different patterns of perceptions and attitudes may emerge among South Korean local 
government officials working for RIGOs. 
 
Table 24. The Five Factor Group Viewpoints on the Five Dimensions of RIGOs 
 Agenda  Membership  Ambition Scale Legitimacy 
Factor 1:  
Agenda-broadening 




Factor 1-:  
Agenda-narrowing 




Factor 2:  
Membership-
expanding 




Factor 3:  
Equality-promoting 
Broad  Exclusive (more government-centric)  Moderate Important Important 
Factor 4:  
Local govt.-centric 














In the sixth and final chapter of this study, I will first summarize the findings of the study. 
Then, in the second and third sections, I will discuss the implications, both theoretical and practical, 
of the findings of this study. Lastly, I will conclude by discussing some limitations of this study 
and proposing future research agendas. 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This dissertation research is a systemic study of subjectivity to better understand how South 
Korean local government officials perceive the past and current practice, future prospects, and 
potential avenues for development of multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the 
governments that they work for.  
To this purpose, I first reviewed the extant literature (primarily Western) on cross-boundary 
intergovernmental organizations, both within the United States and beyond the country, in terms 
of their core attributes and activities as well as historical changes and the evolution of them. Also, 
I identified some limitations of the current literature on cross-boundary intergovernmental 
organizations and proposed that the RIGO framework helps overcome such limitations. 
Next, I provided a brief historical overview of South Korea’s local autonomy and regional 
governance. In so doing, I identified the lack of a broad, systemic scholarly investigation into how 
multi-lateral cross-boundary collaboration among local governments in South Korea is organized 
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and practiced. Thus, I tested whether the RIGO framework was exportable beyond the United 
States territory and applicable to the South Korean context. 
Lastly, using Q-method, I identified that there exist at least five different patterns of 
thoughts and attitudes toward RIGOs among South Korean local government officials. South 
Korean local government officials who work for RIGOs to promote development of multi-lateral 
cross-boundary collaboration among the government that they work for can be categorized into 
agenda-broadening officials, agenda-narrowing officials, membership-expanding officials, 
equality-promoting officials, and local-government-centric officials. I also provided each type’s 
profile and discussed what major consensus and disagreement exist among those types. In addition, 
I demonstrated that there exist relationships between RIGOs’ key organizational characteristics 
and the five revealed patterns of thoughts and attitudes toward RIGOs. Based on the findings, I 
proposed a conceptual contour in which the variations of the five different viewpoints along three 
intersecting continua as well as where each viewpoint is situated along each variable are depicted. 
6.2 Implications for Theory 
This dissertation research contributes to scholarship in urban affairs and regional 
governance by filling in the gaps of our understanding of how local government officials perceive 
the past and current practice, future prospects, and potential avenues for development of multi-
lateral cross-boundary collaboration among the governments that they work for. That is, this study 
is a response to Frederickson (1999)’s argument that public administration scholars should strive 
to better understand the development of administrative conjunction in metropolitan areas, 
assuming that networks of professional local government officials provide a foundation for 
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metropolitan cooperation (see also Zeemering, 2019). This study is also an extension of the study 
of intergovernmental relations conducted by Deil Wright, in a sense that this study is an analysis 
of both behavioral and institutional perspectives of intergovernmental relations that have been 
developed among professional local government officials in South Korea. Furthermore, this study 
demonstrates that the RIGO framework is exportable beyond the United States boundaries, 
confirming that the pursuit of large-scale comparative research using the framework is feasible. 
6.3 Implications for Policy and Management 
Especially important for practitioners in South Korea, this study provides an insight into 
how to promote multi-lateral cross-boundary collaborations among the local governments through 
RIGOs by considering insider perspectives of professional local government officials who work 
for them. As reviewed in chapter three, city-county consolidation, once a popular means of solving 
urban and regional problems, has thus far failed to deliver its promises (e.g. improvement in 
technical efficiency, improvement in fiscal management, and narrowing urban vs. rural disparities). 
Thus, it is time to unlock and leverage on the potential of RIGOs in improving regional governance, 
especially by considering viewpoints of professionals who work for them, as it is likely that they 
know better than laypeople in maximizing the strength and minimizing the weakness of RIGOs. 
Some empirical findings of this study would serve as an initial guidance on making such 
improvements. For example, since this study’s prospective assessment of how RIGOs are viewed 
by South Korean local government officials is strongly linked to how those officials understand 
their respective organization’s goals, the findings of this study could help not only the regional 
governance scholarship but also policymakers and public administrators better understand how 
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different perspectives on RIGOs affect the behavior of local government officials and the operation 
of RIGOs especially in terms of goal setting, goal clarification, and goal prioritization. Such an 
improved understanding of perceived organizational goals could be helpful in better clarifying 
goals, and the heightened clarity of organizational goals in turn is likely to improve organizational 
performance (Rainey and Jung, 2014). 
In addition, as identified in this study, there exists the universe of RIGOs outside of South 
Korea. Therefore, when South Korean practitioners want to improve their institutional 
arrangements and operations of RIGOs by learning from the best practices, they would be able to 
find exemplars outside of the country using the findings of this study (e.g. RIGOs in the United 
States, communauté de communes and communauté d'agglomération in France, Regional 
Collaborative Associations from Deltametropolis in the Netherlands, and Koiki Rengo in Japan) 
that they can make reference to.  
6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
In this study, I have set out an original set of five viewpoints of South Korean local 
government officials on RIGOs. Although the five factor groups (patterns) of thoughts and 
attitudes toward RIGOs identified in this study open promising lines of research to be conducted 
in the future, this study is not without its weaknesses and limitations. One limitation of this study 
is that the findings are local-specific and thus this study’s theorizing is also site-specific. One way 
to overcome such a limitation is to conduct systematic comparison using the same methodology 
(e.g. Durose et al., 2016). Also, although this study demonstrates not only the distinctiveness of 
the viewpoints but also similarities and overlaps of those viewpoints, as to how agenda, 
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membership, and ambition are related to each other is not yet clear. This ambiguity is another 
limitation of this study. Therefore, one example of interesting future research agenda would be an 
investigation into how each dimension is related to another (e.g. are agenda and membership 
complementary or contrasting?). Also, the exploratory evidence of this study suggests the 
possibility of a relationship between how RIGOs are perceived and RIGO characteristics. 
Therefore, another example of an interesting future study, which would involve various R-method 
skills and techniques in research design as well as data collection and analysis, is on whether 
various organizational characteristics as well as personal attributes have any impact on how RIGOs 
are perceived among regional governance experts. Last but not least, another interesting related 
future research question involves the life cycle of the five perspectives: do individuals’ 
perspectives change over time, and if so, what patterns exist? 
 This dissertation study, in conclusion, recommends future studies to consider “the 
configuration, coexistence, collaboration, and contestation” (Durose et al., 2016: 584) of different 
perspectives within a particular regional context and how these perspectives may evolve through 
a series of interactions. It is recommended that further studies consider the nature and development 
of RIGOs over time, “the relationships and transitions” among the five perspectives, and their 
“interrelation with particular conditions, contexts, and institutional designs” (Durose et al., 2016: 
584).  
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Appendix A Current Political and Administrative Structures of Local Government in 
South Korea in Brief 
South Korea is a unitary state whereby the ultimately supreme national government 
delegates authority to various lower tiers of government in the country. In South Korea, at the time 
of this writing, there are seventeen autonomous first-tier, or upper-tier, administrative divisions, 
often referred to as regional governments: there are one special city (which is also the capital city 
of the country), six metropolitan cities, one special self-governing city (which is also the 
administrative capital city of the country), and nine provinces (including one special self-
governing province). The first-tier administrative divisions are divided into 258 autonomous 
second-tier, or lower-tier, administrative subdivisions, often referred to as municipal governments: 
there are seventy-five cities, eighty-two counties, and 101 districts. The lower-tier governments 
are further subdivided into smaller nonautonomous entities at “an administrative level to 
implement higher legal and administrative acts within their jurisdiction” (Anderson, 2019: 4). 
Local councils and executives (governors for the regional governments and mayors and 
supervisors for the municipal governments) are elected for both the regional and municipal level 
local governments every four years. The local councils “act as the representative body as well as 
the highest authority for a local government in the realm of autonomous functions” (Anderson, 
2019: 6; see also Y. Choi, 2016 and C. Park, 2006). However, there have been criticisms that local 
councils lack policy expertise (Anderson, 2019; C. Park, 2006). In the meanwhile, the local 
executive acts as the chief of the local administration managing local government employees as 
well as local government budget and property (Anderson, 2019: 7; see also Y. Choi, 2016 and C. 
Park, 2006). There are two types of responsibilities that autonomous local governments address: 
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responsibilities delegated by the national government and “issues that only concern the local 
jurisdiction” (Anderson, 2019: 7). The former are referred to as delegated responsibilities whereas 
the latter are referred to as autonomous responsibilities (Anderson, 2019). As to the delegated 
responsibilities, examples are “registering residents and maintaining data for election rolls” 
(Anderson, 2019: 7). The Local Autonomy Act lists in detail possible local functions that include 
“selection of local personnel, local development and economic management, local welfare, and 
local planning” (Anderson, 2019: 7) and they are autonomous responsibilities. As to the issue of 
fiscal decentralization, “the range of fiscal resources varies greatly among government, with some 
governments having very little independence” (Anderson, 2019: 8). Although the national 
government still maintains the strongest taxes for itself and local governments do not yet have a 
great degree of fiscal flexibility, some effort has been made “to give local governments more 
resources by transferring taxes” from the national government “to the local governments as well 
as through subsidies and grants” (Anderson, 2019: 8). Thus, the “actual level of fiscal autonomy 
in general has been estimated to be about 90% of the OECD average” (Anderson, 2019: 8; see also 
Y. Choi, 2016: 149-150). 
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Appendix B City-County Consolidations in South Korea: 1995-2012  
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Appendix C Articles, Sections, and Subsections of Local Autonomy Act Relevant to Three 
Types of Regional Governance 
Article 151 (Entrustment of Affairs)  
(1) A local government or the head thereof may entrust part of the affairs within its 
competence to any other local government or the head thereof to manage such part of 
affairs. In such cases, the head of the local government shall report thereon to the Minister 
of the Interior and Safety and the head of the relevant central administrative agency if a 
party entrusted with such affairs is the City/Do or the head thereof, and to the Mayor/Do 
Governor if a party entrusted with such affairs is the Si/Gun/autonomous Gu or the head 
thereof. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act 
No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(2) If a local government or the head thereof wishes to entrust affairs under paragraph (1), 
the local government or the head thereof shall establish the rules in consultation with the 
competent local government and provide public notice of such rules. 
(3) The rules for entrustment of affairs under paragraph (2) shall include the matters falling 
under the following subparagraphs: 
1. The local government entrusting the affairs and local government entrusted with 
them; 
2. Details and scope of the entrusted affairs; 
3. Management and handling method of the entrusted affairs; 
4. Allotment of expenses required for the management and handling of the entrusted 
affairs and the method of disbursing such expenses; 
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5. Other necessary matters concerning the entrustment of affairs. 
(4) If a local government or the head thereof intends to change or terminate entrustment of 
affairs, the local government or the head thereof shall provide public notice thereof in 
consultation with the competent local government or the head thereof, and report it to the 
Minister of the Interior and Safety and the head of the relevant central administrative 
agency, or to the Mayor/Do Governor, according to the example under paragraph (1). 
<Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, 
Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(5) Where affairs are entrusted, any municipal ordinance or municipal rule concerning the 
management and handling of the entrusted affairs shall also apply to the local government 
entrusted with the affairs, except as otherwise provided for in the rules for entrustment of 
affairs. 
 
Article 152 (Formation of Administrative Consultative Council) 
(1) Local governments may establish an administrative consultative council (hereinafter 
referred to as "consultative council") for joint performance of part of any affairs involving 
two or more local governments. In such cases, the heads of the local governments shall 
report it to the Minister of the Interior and Safety and the head of the central administrative 
agency concerned if Cities/Dos are the members thereof, and to the competent Mayor/Do 
Governor if Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus are the members thereof. <Amended by Act No. 
8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act 
No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
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(2) If local governments seek to establish a consultative council, they shall provide public 
notice thereof after formulating rules through consultation among the competent local 
governments, and going through resolutions of the respective local councils concerned. 
(3) The Minister of the Interior and Safety or the Mayor/Do Governor may recommend the 
competent local governments to establish a consultative council if necessary for the public 
interest. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act 
No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
 
Article 153 (Organization of Consultative Council) 
(1) A consultative council shall consist of a chairperson and members. 
(2) The chairperson and members shall be elected from among the employees of the 
competent local governments in accordance with the rules of the consultative council. 
(3) The chairperson shall represent the consultative council, convene the meeting, and 
manage all affairs thereof. 
 
Article 154 (Rules of Consultative Council) 
The rules of a consultative council shall include the following matters: 
1. Title of the consultative council; 
2. Local governments that constitute the consultative council; 
3. Affairs to be managed by the consultative council; 
4. Organization of the consultative council and the method of election of the 
chairperson and members; 
127 
5. Method for bearing and disbursing expenses necessary for the operation of the 
consultative council and the management of affairs thereof; 
6. Other necessary matters concerning the formation and operation of the 
consultative council. 
 
Article 155 (Request of Consultative Council for Presentation of Materials, etc.) 
If deemed necessary for handling its affairs, the consultative council may request 
the heads of the competent local governments to present materials, express their 
opinions and provide any other necessary cooperation. 
 
Article 156 (Mediation of Matters for Consultation) 
(1) If the heads of local governments request mediation of matters that have not been agreed 
upon by the consultative council concerned, such matters may be mediated by the Minister 
of the Interior and Safety if such matters are for consultation among Cities/Dos, or by the 
competent Mayor/Do Governor if such matters are for consultation among 
Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus: Provided, That if the competent Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus 
extend over two or more Cities/Dos, the Minister of the Interior and Safety may mediate 
such matters. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; 
Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(2) If the Minister of the Interior and Safety or the Mayor/Do Governor intends to offer 
mediation as referred to in paragraph (1), he/ she shall do so according to the deliberation 
of the dispute mediation committee as prescribed in Article 149 after consultation with the 
head of the central administrative agency concerned. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 
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2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 
26, 2017> 
 
Article 157 (Effect of Consultation and Handling of Affairs by Consultative Council) 
(1) The local governments which have constituted a consultative council shall handle their 
affairs according to the matters determined by the consultative council, if any. 
(2) With respect to the matters mediated by the Minister of the Interior and Safety or the 
Mayor/Do Governor under Article 156 (1), the provisions of Article 148 (3) through (6) 
shall apply mutatis mutandis. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, 
Mar. 23, 2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(3) If the consultative council has handled affairs in the names of the competent local 
governments or the heads thereof, such affairs shall be deemed to have been conducted by 
the competent local governments or the heads thereof. 
 
Article 158 (Modification of Rules and Abolishment of Consultative Council) 
If local governments seek to modify the rules of the consultative council or to 
abolish the consultative council, the provisions of Article 152 (1) and (2) shall apply 
mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 159 (Establishment of Local Government Association) 
(1) If necessary for joint performance of one or more affairs by two or more local 
governments, they may establish a local government association, after formulating rules 
and going through resolutions of the local councils concerned, with the approval from the 
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Minister of the Interior and Safety in the case of Cities/Dos, or with the approval from the 
competent Mayor/Do Governor in the case of Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus: Provided, That 
if the Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus that are the members of the local government association 
extend over two or more Cities/Dos, approval from the Minister of the Interior and Safety 
shall be obtained. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 
2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(2) The local government association shall be a juristic person. 
 
Article 160 (Organization of Local Government Association) 
(1) A local government association shall have a board of the local government association, 
president of the local government association, and other clerical personnel. 
(2) The members of the board of the local government association, the president of the 
local government association, and other clerical personnel shall be selected and appointed 
under the rules of the local government association. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 35 (1) and 96 (1), members of the local 
councils of the competent local governments and the heads of such local governments may 
hold concurrently the office of members of the board of the local government association 
or the president of the local government association. 
 
Article 161 (Authority of Board and President of Local Government Association) 
(1) The board of a local government association shall deliberate and decide on important 
affairs of the local government association, as prescribed by rules of the local government 
association. 
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(2) The board of the local government association may determine the user fees, fees, or 
allotted charges for any service furnished by the local government association within the 
scope of the municipal ordinance under Article 139 (1). 
(3) The president of the local government association shall represent the local government 
association, and exercise general direction and control over affairs of the local government 
association. 
 
Article 162 (Rules of Local Government Association) 
The rules of a local government association shall include the following matters: 
1. Title of the local government association; 
2. Local governments that constitute the local government association; 
3. Location of the local government association’s office; 
4. Affairs of the local government association; 
5. Organization of the board of the local government association and the method of 
appointing the members thereof; 
6. Organization of the executive organs and the method of appointment; 
7. Method for bearing and disbursing expenses necessary for the operation and the 
handling of affairs of the local government association; 
8. Other matters concerning the establishment and operation of the local 
government association. 
 
Article 163 (Direction and Supervision of Local Government Association) 
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(1) A local government association in which Cities/Dos are the members shall be directed 
and supervised by the Minister of the Interior and Safety, and a local government 
association in which Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus are the members shall be directed and 
supervised primarily by the competent Mayor/Do Governor, and secondarily by the 
Minister of the Interior and Safety: Provided, That if the Sis/Guns/autonomous Gus that 
are the members of the local government association extend over two or more Cities/Dos, 
the local government association shall be directed and supervised by the Minister of the 
Interior and Safety. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 
2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
(2) If necessary for the public interest, the Minister of the Interior and Safety may order 
the establishment or dissolution of a local government association, or the modification of 
the rules thereof. <Amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 
2013; Act No. 12844, Nov. 19, 2014; Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017> 
 
Article 164 (Modification of Rules of Local Government Association, and Dissolution Thereof) 
(1) In modifying the rules of a local government association or dissolving a local 
government association, the provisions of Article 159 (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(2) If a local government association is dissolved, the assets thereof shall be disposed of 
through consultation among the competent local governments concerned. 
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Appendix D List of Local Governments and Their Membership in RIGOs and Non-RIGO 














RIGO membership (in 
Korean) 
RIGO membership (in 
English) 
1 종로구 Jongno district 3     
2 중구 Jung district 0     
3 용산구 Yongsan district 2     
4 성동구 Seongdong district 4 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
5 광진구 Gwangjin district 2 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
6 동대문구 Dongdaemun district 1 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
7 중랑구 Jungnang district 1 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
8 성북구 Seongbuk district  3 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
9 강북구 Gangbuk district 1     
10 도봉구 Dobong district 3 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
11 노원구 Nowon district 2 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
12 은평구 Eunpyeong district 3     
13 서대문구 Seodaemun district 4     
14 마포구 Mapo district 2     
15 양천구 Yangcheon district 3 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
16 강서구 Gangseo district 4 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
17 구로구 Guro district 4 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
18 금천구 Gumcheon district 4 
안양천수질개선 
대책협의회 




19 영등포구 Yeongdeungpo district 3 
안양천수질개선 
대책협의회 
Anyang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
20 동작구 Dongjak district 3 
안양천수질개선 
대책협의회 
Anyang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
21 관악구 Gwanak district 1 
안양천수질개선 
대책협의회 
Anyang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 


















25 강동구 Gangdong distrcit 2     
26 중구 Jung district  0     
27 서구 Seo distrcit 0     
28 동구 Dong district 0     
29 영도구 Yeongdo district 0     
30 부산진구 Busanjin district 0     
31 동래구 Dongnae district 0     
32 남구 Nam district 0     
33 북구 Buk district 0     
34 해운대구 Haeundae district 0     
35 사하구 Saha district 0     
36 금정구 Geumjeong district 0     
37 강서구 Gangseo district 1     
38 연제구 Yeonje district 0     
39 수영구 Suyeong district 0     
40 사상구 Sasang district 0     
41 기장군 Gijang county 1     
42 중구 Jung district 1     
43 동구 Dong district 0     
44 서구 Seo district 1     
45 남구 Nam district 0     
46 북구 Buk district 0     
47 수성구 Suseong district 0     
48 달서구 Dalseo district 0     
49 달성군 Dalseong county 2 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
50 중구 Jung district 0     
51 동구 Dong district 0     
52 남구 Nam district 2     
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53 연수구 Yeonsu district 0     
54 남동구 Namdong district 3     
55 부평구 Bupyeong district 2 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
56 계양구 Gyeyang district 1 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
57 서구 Seo district 1 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
58 강화군 Ganghwa county 3 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
59 옹진군 Ongjin county 1     




















65 동구 Dong district 1     
66 중구 Jung district 0     
67 서구 Seo district 0     
68 유성구 Yuseong district 2 
백제문화권 
관광벨트협의회 
Baekje Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
69 대덕구 Daedeok district 2     
70 중구 Jung district  0     
71 남구 Nam district 0     
72 동구 Dong district 1     
73 북구 Buk district 0     
74 울주군 Ulju county 1     
75 수원시 Suwon city 6     






77 의정부시 Uijeongbu city 3 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 




79 부천시 Bucheon city 7     
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81 평택시 Pyeongtaek city 2     








84 고양시 Goyang city 3     




86 구리시 Guri city 2     
87 남양주시 Namyangju city 4     
88 오산시 Osan city 3     












92 하남시 Hanam  city 3     










95 이천시 Icheon city 2     
96 안성시 Anseong city 1     
97 김포시 Gimpo city 3 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
98 화성시 Hwaseong city 4     
99 광주시 Gwangju city 3     








102 여주시 Yeoju city 3     




104 가평군 Gapyeong county 3     
105 양평군 Yangpyeong county 3     
106 춘천시 Chuncheon city 2     
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107 원주시 Wonju city 2 중부내륙권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
108 강릉시 Gangneung city 1     
109 동해시 Donghae city 0     
110 태백시 Taebaek city 2 폐광지역시장군수협의회 
Abandoned Mine Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
111 속초시 Sokcho city 0     
112 삼척시 Samcheok city 1 폐광지역시장군수협의회 
Abandoned Mine Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
113 홍천군 Hongcheon county 2     
114 횡성군 Hoengseong county 2     
115 영월군 Yeongwol county 4 
중부내륙 행정중심권 
행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
116 평창군 Pyongchang county 4 
중부내륙 행정중심권 
행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
117 정선군 Jeongseon county 3 폐광지역시장군수협의회 
Abandoned Mine Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
118 철원군 Cheorwon county 1     
119 화천군 Hwacheon county 3     
120 양구군 Yanggu county 2     
121 인제군 Inje county 0     
122 고성군 Goseong county 0     
123 양양군 Yangyang county 0     
124 청주시 Cheongju city 3     
125 충주시 Chungju city 4 중부내륙권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
126 제천시 Jecheon city 5 
중부내륙 행정중심권 
행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
127 보은군 Boeun county 6     
128 옥천군 Okcheon county 4     
129 영동군 Yeongdong county 6     
130 증평군 Jeungpyeong  county 1     
131 진천군 Jincheon county 1     
132 괴산군 Goesan county 2 중부내륙권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
133 음성군 Umseong county 3 중부내륙권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
134 단양군 Danyang county 5 
중부내륙 행정중심권 
행정협의회 
Central Inland Region 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 







136 공주시 Gongju city 6 
백제문화권 
관광벨트협의회 
Baekje Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
137 보령시 Boryeong city 4 환황해권 행정협의회 
Yellow Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 












140 논산시 Nonsan city 5 금강권 관광협의회 
Geumgang Area Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
141 계룡시 Gyeryong city 1     






143 금산군 Gumsan county 5 
백제문화권 
관광벨트협의회 
Baekje Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
144 부여군 Buyeo county 6 
백제문화권 
관광벨트협의회 
Baekje Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
145 서천군 Socheon county 6 환황해권 행정협의회 
Yellow Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
146 청양군 Cheongyang county 2     
147 홍성군 Hongseong county 3 환황해권 행정협의회 
Yellow Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
148 예산군 Yesan county 1     






150 전주시 Jeonju city 4     
151 군산시 Gunsan city 3 금강권 관광협의회 
Geumgang Area Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
152 익산시 Iksan city 4 금강권 관광협의회 
Geumgang Area Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
153 정읍시 Jeongeup city 2 
전북서남권 
관광행정협의회 
Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
154 남원시 Namwon city 2 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
155 김제시 Gimje city 1     
156 완주군 Wanju county 3     













160 임실군 Imsil county 5 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
161 순창군 Sunchang county 4 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
162 고창군 Gochang county 4 
전북서남권 
관광행정협의회 
Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
163 부안군 Buan county 3 
전북서남권 
관광행정협의회 
Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism 
Promotion Consultative 
Council 
164 목포시 Mokpo city 2 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
165 여수시 Yeosu city 7 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
166 순천시 Suncheon city 8 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
167 나주시 Naju city 8 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
168 광양시 Gwangyang city 9 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
169 담양군 Damyang county 8 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
170 곡성군 Gokseong county 6 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
171 구례군 Gurye county 4 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
172 고흥군 Goheung county 6 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
173 보성군 Boseong county 3 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
174 화순군 Hwasun county 6 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
175 장흥군 Jangheung county 5     
176 강진군 Gangjin county 5 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
177 해남군 Haenam county 4 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
178 영암군 Yeongam county 4 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
179 무안군 Muan county 4 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
180 함평군 Hampyeong county 7 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 









183 완도군 Wando county 5 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
184 진도군 Jindo county 3 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
185 신안군 Sinan county 4 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
186 포항시 Pohang city 5 
경상북도 동해권 
행정협의회 
East Coast Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
187 경주시 Gyeongju city 6 
경상북도 동해권 
행정협의회 
East Coast Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
188 김천시 Gimcheon city 3 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 






190 구미시 Gumi city 3 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 






192 영천시 Yeongcheon city 8 경산권 행정협의회 
Gyeongsan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
193 상주시 Sangju city 6 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 






195 경산시 Gyeongsan city 3 경산권 행정협의회 
Gyeongsan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
196 군위군 Gunwi county 4 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
197 의성군 Uiseong county 7 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 


















201 청도군 Cheongdo county 3 경산권 행정협의회 
Gyeongsan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
202 고령군 Goryeong county 5 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 




203 성주군 Seongju county 5 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
204 칠곡군 Chilgok county 3 
경상북도 
중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 


















208 울릉군 Ulleung county 3 
경상북도 동해권 
행정협의회 
East Coast Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
209 창원시 Changwon city 3     
210 진주시 Jinju city 6 남해안남중권발전협의회 
Central South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
211 통영시 Tongyeong city 1     
212 사천시 Sacheon city 4 남해안남중권발전협의회 
Central South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
213 김해시 Gimhae city 5     
214 밀양시 Miryang city 1     
215 거제시 Geoje city 1     
216 양산시 Yangsan city 0     
217 의령군 Uiryeong county 2 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
218 함안군 Haman county 3     
219 창녕군 Changnyeong county 4 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
220 고성군 Goseong county 4     
221 남해군 Namhae county 6 남해안남중권발전협의회 
Central South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
222 하동군 Hadong county 8 남해안남중권발전협의회 
Central South Sea Coast 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
223 산청군 Sancheong county 8 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
224 함양군 Hamyang county 7 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
225 거창군 Geochang county 4 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area 
Administrative Consultative 
Council 
226 합천군 Hapcheon county 5 
가야문화권 지역발전 
시장군수 협의회 





Appendix E List of Administrative Councils that Are RIGOs, IGOs, and neither of Them76 
No. 
Administrative consultative council (in 
Korean: RIGO in red) 
Administrative Consultative Council 






1 광주광역시 구청장협의회 
Gwangju Administrative Consultative 
Conference 
광주 동·서·남·북·광산구 5 0 
2 빛고을 생활권 행정협의회 
Gwangju Region Administrative 
Consultative Council 
광주 동·서·남·북·광산구, 나주, 담양, 
화순, 함평, 장성 
10 3 
3 경기중부권 행정협의회 
Central Gyeonggi Administrative 
Consultative Council 
안양, 안산, 광명, 시흥, 군포, 과천, 
의왕 
7 5 
4 동두천권 행정협의회 
Dongducheon Administrative 
Consultative Council 
파주, 포천, 양주, 동두천, 연천 5 5 
5 경기도시장군수협의회 
Gyeonggi Administrative Consultative 
Conference 
수원, 성남, 고양, 부천, 용인, 안산, 
안양, 남양주, 의정부, 평택, 시흥, 
화성, 광명, 파주, 군포, 광주, 김포, 
이천, 구리, 양주, 안성, 포천, 오산, 
하남, 의왕, 동두천, 과천, 양평, 가평, 
연천 
31 2 
6 시흥·안산시 정책협의회 
Siheung-Ansan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
시흥, 안산 2 0 
7 시흥·부천시 정책협의회 
Siheung-Bucheon Administrative 
Consultative Council 
시흥, 부천 2 0 
8 백두대간 광역행정협의회 
Baekdudaegan Mountain Area 
Administrative Consultative Council 
영월, 태백, 정선, 평창 4 3 
9 폐광지역시장군수협의회 
Abandoned Mine Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
태백, 삼척, 영월, 정선 4 4 
10 중부내륙권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Administrative 
Consultative Council 
원주, 여주, 충주, 괴산, 음성, 단양, 
문경 
7 4 
11 경상북도 중ㆍ서부권행정협의회 
Central & West Gyeongbuk 
Administrative Consultative Council 
김천, 구미, 상주, 군위, 의성, 고령, 
성주, 칠곡 
8 3 
12 남부권 행정협의회 
South Chungbuk Administrative 
Consultative Council 
보은, 옥천, 영동 3 0 
13 충북 북부권 행정협의회 
North Chungbuk Administrative 
Consultative Council 
충주, 제천, 단양 3 0 
14 천안·아산 생활권 행정협의회 
Cheonan-Asan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
천안, 아산 2 4 
15 서산·당진·태안생활권 행정협의회 
Seosan-Dangjin-Taean Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서산, 당진, 태안 3 3 
16 환황해권 행정협의회 
Yellow Sea Coast Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서산, 보령, 당진, 태안, 서천, 홍성 6 3 
17 전주권 행정협의회 
Jeonju Administrative Consultative 
Council 
전주, 익산, 김제, 완주, 임실 5 0 
18 무진장 행복생활권 협의회 
Muju-Jinan-Jangsu Administrative 
Consultative Council 
장수, 무주, 진안 3 3 
19 여수·순천·광양시 행정협의회 
Yeosu-Suncheon-Gwangyang 
Administrative Consultative Council 
여수, 순천, 광양 3 0 
20 순천권 행정협의회 
Suncheon Region Administrative 
Consultative Council 
여수, 순천, 광양, 구례, 곡성 5 0 
 
76 Colored in red are RIGOs and colored in black are either IGOs or neither of the two. 
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21 전남 북부권 행정협의회 
North Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
나주, 담양, 화순, 함평, 영광, 장성 6 4 
22 남해안권 행정협의회 
South Sea Coast Administrative 
Consultative Council 
강진, 장흥, 보성, 고흥, 완도 5 0 
23 서남해안권 행정협의회 
West South Sea Coast Administrative 
Consultative Council 
목포, 해남, 영암, 무안, 완도, 진도, 
강진, 신안 
8 6 
24 영산강유역권 행정협의회 
Youngsan River Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
목포, 나주, 담양, 화순, 영암, 무안, 
함평, 장성 
8 4 
25 나남발전 행정협의회 
Nanam Administrative Consultative 
Council 
나주, 광주 남구 2 0 
26 광주광역시 근교권 행정협의회 
Gwangju Suburb Administrative 
Consultative Council 
나주, 담양, 화순, 장성 4 0 
27 광양만권발전협의회 
Gwangyang Region Administrative 
Consultative Council 
순천, 여수, 광양 3 0 
28 전남 4 촌 정책연합회 
4 Rural Counties Administrative 
Consultative Council 
완도, 장성, 장흥, 강진 4 0 
29 서북지역 행복생활권 협의회 
Northwest Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
장성, 함평, 영광 3 2 
30 상생협력 정책협의회 
Southern Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
강진, 장흥, 영암 3 0 
31 전남 동부생활권 협의회 
East Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
여수, 순천, 광양, 고흥, 보성 5 3 
32 경산권 행정협의회 
Gyeongsan Administrative Consultative 
Council 
영천, 경산, 청도 3 5 
33 경상북도 북부권 행정협의회 
North Gyeongbuk Administrative 
Consultative Council 
안동, 영주, 상주, 문경, 의성, 청송, 
영양, 영덕, 예천, 봉화, 울진 
11 4 
34 경북시장군수 협의회 
Gyeongbuk Administrative Consultative 
Conference 
경북 23 개 시·군 23 0 
35 영천·경산시 행정협의회 
Yeongcheon-Kyeongsan Administrative 
Consultative Council 
영천, 경산 2 0 
36 경상북도 동해권 행정협의회 
East Coast Gyeongbuk Administrative 
Consultative Council 
포항, 경주, 영천, 영덕, 울진, 울릉 6 6 
37 마창연담권 행정협의회 
Masan-Changwon Region 
Administrative Consultative Council 
창원, 김해, 함안, 창녕 4 0 
38 서부권행정 협의회 
West Kyeongnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
진주, 사천, 고성, 하동, 산청 5 0 
39 서북부경남 행정협의회 
North West Kyeongnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
함양, 산청, 합천, 거창 4 0 
40 산청 함양공동 현안 행정협의회 
Sancheong-Hamyang Administrative 
Consultative Council 




진주, 사천 2 0 
42 서부수도권 행정협의회 
West Capital Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
강서, 양천, 구로, 부천, 광명, 시흥, 
김포, 계양, 부평, 서구, 강화 
11 6 
43 서낙동강 행정협의회 
West Nakdong River Administrative 
Consultative Council 
김해, 부산 강서 2 0 
44 군산서천 행정협의회 
Gunsan-Socheon Administrative 
Consultative Council 
군산, 서천 2 0 
45 21 세기뉴리더 행정협의회 
West Jeonnam Administrative 
Consultative Council 
나주, 무안, 함평 3 0 
46 장수벨트 행정협의회 
East Jeolla Administrative Consultative 
Council 
곡성, 담양, 순창, 구례 4 2 
47 중부내륙 행정중심권 행정협의회 
Central Inland Region Administrative 
Consultative Council 
영월, 평창, 제천, 단양, 영주, 봉화 6 3 
48 남해안남중권발전협의회 
Central South Sea Coast Administrative 
Consultative Council 
여수, 순천, 광영, 고흥, 보성, 진주, 
사천, 남해, 하동 
9 4 
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49 하동-광양 공생발전협의회 
Hadong-Gwangyang Administrative 
Consultative Council 




시흥시, 남동구 2 0 
51 시가문화권 보존·복원 행정협의회 
Jeolla Cultural Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
전남, 광주, 담양, 광주 북구 4 0 
52 잠실권역 물관리협의회 
Jamsil Water Management 
Administrative Consultative Council 
서울, 구리, 남양주, 하남, 포천 5 0 
53 전국동주도시 교류협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Ju Cities 
제주, 경주, 공주, 나주, 상주, 광주, 
영주, 원주, 전주, 진주, 청주, 충주, 
파주, 양주 
14 3 
54 전국 마늘주산단지 시군광역협의회 
Garlic Producing Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서산, 태안, 고흥, 해남, 무안, 함평, 
신안, 영천, 의성, 창녕, 남해 
11 3 
55 더불어 함께하는 도시협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Co-development Cities 
공주, 강릉, 광양, 구미, 수원, 전주, 
제주, 창원, 청주 
9 3 
56 가야문화권 행정협의회 
Gaya Administrative Consultative 
Council 
김해, 함안, 고성, 상주, 고령, 성주 6 3 
57 지리산권 단체장협의회 
Jiri Mountain Area Administrative 
Consultative Conference 
산청, 함양, 하동, 구례, 곡성, 장수, 
남원 
8 0 
58 섬진강 환경행정협의회 
Seomjin River Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
순천, 광양, 곡성, 구례, 순창, 하동, 
장수, 진안, 임실, 남원, 남해 
11 4 
59 안양천수질개선 대책협의회 
Anyang Stream Basin Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서울 구로, 강서, 관악, 금천, 동작, 
양천, 영등포, 경기 안양, 광명, 군포, 
부천, 시흥, 의왕 
13 4 
60 환경행정협의회 
Central North Seoul Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서울 은평, 종로, 마포, 서대문 4 0 
61 탄천·양재천유역 환경행정협의회 
Tancheon-Yangjaecheon 
Administrative Consultative Council 
서울 강남, 서초, 송파, 경기 성남, 
과천, 용인 
6 4 
62 백제문화권 관광벨트협의회 
Baeje Cultural Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
금산, 공주, 부여, 유성, 무주 5 3 
63 전국대도시 시장협의회 
Administrative Consultative Conference 
of Major Cities 
수원, 성남, 고양, 부천, 안양, 용인, 
안산, 화성, 남양주, 청주, 천안, 전주, 
포항, 창원, 김해 
15 1 
64 삽교호권역 물관리대책협의회 
Sapgyoho Lake Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
세종, 천안, 아산, 당진, 청양, 홍성, 
예산 
7 0 
65 금강권 관광협의회 
Geumgang Area Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
부여, 공주, 군산, 논산, 서천, 익산 6 3 
66 전북서남권 관광행정협의회 
Southwest Jeonbuk Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
정읍, 부안, 고창 3 3 
67 남부권 관광협의회 
South Chungbuk Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
보은, 옥천, 영동 3 0 
68 원전소재 지방자치단체 행정협의회 
Power Plant Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
경주, 기장, 울주, 울진, 영광 5 3 
69 전국고추 주산단지 시장군수 협의회 
Chilli Pepper Producing Area 
Administrative Consultative Council 
안동, 의성, 영양, 청송, 봉화, 예천, 
태안, 충주, 제천, 괴산, 음성, 단양, 
해남, 고창, 임실, 영월 
15 3 
70 
가야문화권 지역발전 시장군수 
협의회 
Gaya Cultural Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
고령, 성주, 달성, 거창, 의령, 함양, 
합천, 산청, 창녕, 남원, 장수, 순천, 
하동, 광양, 함안 
15 3 
71 사과주산지 시장군수협의회 
Apple Producing Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
영주, 안동, 의성, 청송, 문경, 봉화, 
상주, 포항, 예천, 군위, 영천, 영덕, 
영양, 김천, 경주 
15 3 
72 서부경남관광 진흥협의회 
West Gyeongnam Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
진주, 통영, 사천, 거제, 고성, 남해, 
하동, 산청, 함양, 거창, 합천 
11 3 
73 노령산맥권 관광행정협의회 
Noryeong Mountain Range Tourism 
Promotion Consultative Council 
정읍, 고창, 순창, 담양, 장성 5 0 
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74 3 도 3 군 관광벨트협의회 
3 Rural Counties Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
금산, 영동, 무주 3 3 
75 금강권 댐 유역 공동발전협의회 
Geumgang Dam Area Administrative 
Consultative Council 
옥천, 금산, 대전 동구, 대덕, 무주, 
보은, 영동, 장수, 진안 
10 0 
76 전국 한방도시협력회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Oriental Medicine Cities 
산청, 금산, 장흥, 진안, 평창, 함양, 




동부권 광역자원회수시설 공동설치 
운영위원회 
East Gyeonggi Administrative 
Consultative Council 
광주, 하남, 여주, 양평, 이천 5 0 
78 
춘천권역 서울춘천 고속도로 
통행료지원 행정협의회 
Chuncheon Highway Area 
Administrative Consultative Council 
춘천, 홍천, 화천, 양구, 가평 5 2 
79 중랑천 생태 하천협의회 
Jungrang Stream Basin Administrative 
Consultative Council 
서울 광진, 중랑, 노원, 성동, 도봉, 
성북, 동대문, 경기 의정부 
10 3 
80 
전국 댐 소재지 시장·군수·구청장 
협의회 
Dam Area Administrative Consultative 
Conference 
대덕, 춘천, 횡성, 화천, 충주, 보령, 
진안, 임실, 부안, 순천, 광양, 장흥, 
안동, 영천, 청도, 진주, 밀양, 합천 
21 3 
81 대한민국 아름다운 섬 발전협의회 
Island Development Administrative 
Consultative Council 
강화, 옹진, 보령, 여수, 고흥, 완도, 
진도, 신안, 울릉, 남해 
10 3 
82 전국 농어촌지역 군수협의회 
Administrative Consultative Conference 
of Rural Counties 
강화, 연천, 가평, 양평, 횡성, 평창, 
정선, 철원, 화천,양구, 보은, 영동, 
증평, 진천, 음성, 단양, 부여, 서천, 
홍성, 태안, 완주, 진안, 무주, 장수, 
임실, 순창, 고창, 부안, 담양, 곡성, 
고흥, 화순, 강진, 해남, 영암, 함평, 
영광, 장성, 완도, 진도, 신안, 군위, 
의성, 청송, 영덕, 고령, 성주, 칠곡, 
봉화, 의령, 함안, 창녕, 고성, 남해, 
하동, 산청, 함양, 거창, 합천 
59 4 
83 전국 다문화도시협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council for 
Multicultural Cities 
종로, 성동, 서대문, 강서, 구로, 수원, 
안양, 부천, 평택, 안산, 고양, 남양주, 
시흥, 용인, 김포, 화성, 광주, 포천, 
성남, 인천 남동, 광주광산, 천안, 
아산, 김해 
24 2 
84 경부선 지하화 추진 협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Gyeongbu-railway area 
서울 동작, 영등포, 구로, 금천, 용산, 
경기 안양, 군포 
7 3 
85 금강 수상관광 상생발전협의회 
Geumgang Tourism Promotion 
Consultative Council 
부여, 익산, 논산, 서천 4 4 
86 전국사회연대경제지방정부협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
cities for Social-economy 
서울 성북구, 도봉구, 노원구, 은평구, 
서대문구, 강서구, 금천구, 강동구, 
대구 서구, 달성군, 인천 남구, 남동구, 
부평구, 광주 광산구, 대전 유성구, 
울산 동구, 경기 수원, 성남, 부천, 
광명, 오산, 시흥, 강원 홍천, 충남 
논산, 부여, 서천, 전북 군산, 완주, 
진안, 전남 나주 
30 3 
87 동해남부권해오름동맹상생협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Sunrise Cities 
울산, 포항, 경주 3 4 
88 충청산업문화철도행정협의회 
Chungcheong Railway Area 
Administrative Consultative Council 
세종, 공주, 보령, 부여, 청양 5 2 
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89 혁신교육 지방정부 협의회 
Administrative Consultative Council of 
Cities for Innovative Education 
서울 종로구, 용산구, 성동구, 광진구, 
성북구, 강북구, 도봉구, 은평구, 
서대문구, 마포구, 양천구,  강서구, 
금천구, 영등포구, 동작구, 강동구, 
인천 남구, 광구 서구, 경기 수원시, 
화성시, 의정부시, 시흥시, 광명시, 
오산시, 충북 제천시, 보은군, 충남 










Appendix G Unrotated Factor Matrix 
Part.Num. Participant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
1 Par1 -0.4049 0.1487 0.252 -0.1853 0.374 -0.2493 -0.0741 -0.1776 
2 Par2 -0.5333 0.2244 0.1297 -0.4671 -0.0622 -0.2597 0.2271 0.0313 
3 Par3 -0.2465 0.1805 0.2282 -0.5933 0.0928 -0.3409 0.0299 -0.0343 
4 Par4 -0.3456 -0.062 0.5563 -0.1145 0.0762 -0.5122 -0.115 -0.0359 
5 Par5 -0.4207 -0.214 0.3896 -0.3167 0.1518 -0.2104 -0.2385 0.2462 
6 Par6 -0.0041 0.2043 0.6644 0.3722 0.0378 -0.2758 0.3306 -0.015 
7 Par7 0.573 0.2314 0.2599 0.2568 0.2035 -0.213 0.0065 0.232 
8 Par8 0.3844 0.2428 -0.0036 0.6202 -0.231 -0.2199 0.2118 0.2118 
9 Par9 0.2701 0.6054 -0.0961 -0.0046 0.1477 -0.07 -0.2624 0.3776 
10 Par10 -0.1388 0.251 0.1188 -0.2341 0.3498 0.5613 -0.2522 0.0863 
11 Par11 0.0565 0.6057 0.0616 0.1039 0.2267 0.2562 -0.0765 -0.4221 
12 Par12 0.3129 0.6382 -0.0882 -0.0572 -0.1185 -0.072 -0.5086 0.0621 
13 Par13 0.0523 0.6448 -0.4328 -0.2238 -0.0444 0.1887 0.0461 0.168 
14 Par14 -0.0508 -0.3705 -0.1971 -0.1464 0.4086 0.3725 0.5548 0.1397 
15 Par15 -0.2721 0.1707 0.3449 0.2777 0.5378 0.2401 -0.2933 0.0229 
16 Par16 0.3781 0.2329 -0.1196 0.6446 -0.1651 0.0122 0.0205 -0.1908 
17 Par17 0.0588 0.2599 0.3638 0.6394 0.1745 -0.1059 0.0528 0.1997 
18 Par18 -0.1349 0.4717 0.0734 0.4794 0.0534 0.2275 0.4682 0.0465 
19 Par19 0.0864 0.3096 -0.4293 -0.3062 0.3407 -0.014 0.3206 0.4296 
20 Par20 -0.0845 -0.1225 0.8072 0.2987 0.2809 0.0636 0.0111 0.1338 
21 Par21 0.6923 0.4351 -0.0881 -0.2104 0.0473 -0.1802 0.0615 -0.1413 
22 Par22 0.67 0.1733 0.1039 -0.1039 0.2333 0.1649 0.0658 -0.3166 
23 Par23 0.1777 0.1803 -0.0054 -0.254 0.0744 -0.3608 0.4577 -0.355 
24 Par24 0.4092 -0.0031 0.5709 -0.2956 -0.4405 0.0922 0.0835 0.1031 
25 Par25 0.6919 -0.3393 0.3243 -0.0558 -0.1525 0.0992 0.0856 0.1833 
26 Par26 0.6052 0.4894 -0.0873 -0.2587 -0.176 -0.1876 0.0367 0.0584 
27 Par27 -0.8454 0.2746 -0.0432 -0.134 0.2087 0.0238 0.1035 0.0003 
28 Par28 -0.7942 -0.099 0.0804 -0.171 0.0548 0.057 0.0603 0.2595 
29 Par29 0.7847 -0.0662 0.2173 -0.1815 0.1592 0.0683 -0.0581 -0.1897 
30 Par30 0.5818 -0.2346 0.3668 -0.2899 0.0083 0.31 -0.0727 0.0438 
31 Par31 0.7419 0.2591 -0.002 -0.2696 0.1459 -0.0952 0.1107 -0.0772 
32 Par32 -0.8745 0.1448 0.1097 0.0303 -0.234 0.0199 -0.0108 -0.1154 
33 Par33 -0.8961 0.2627 -0.0453 0.0073 -0.1427 -0.1388 -0.0741 0.0175 
34 Par34 -0.8677 0.2502 -0.0518 -0.0617 -0.0004 -0.1073 -0.0608 0.0991 
35 Par35 0.839 0.0157 0.1555 -0.1292 0.0917 -0.0749 -0.1457 -0.2032 
148 
36 Par36 -0.7663 0.0973 0.1655 -0.0769 -0.1527 0.2897 0.068 -0.2296 
37 Par37 -0.4904 0.4021 0.4479 -0.0071 -0.3263 0.3906 -0.0004 -0.1882 
38 Par38 -0.4254 0.3035 0.4123 -0.3536 -0.3316 0.2461 0.2603 0.027 
39 Par39 0.4533 0.2416 0.3008 -0.1584 -0.5072 0.2366 -0.0382 0.2868 
40 Par40 0.6045 0.1524 0.3624 -0.3124 0.1954 0.152 0.1971 0.0902 
41 Par41 0.8671 -0.1754 0.034 -0.1812 -0.0975 0.0045 -0.049 0.0674 
          
 Eigenvalues 11.9116076 3.8966387 3.7797084 3.58374916 2.2327837 2.18234016 1.81461101 1.5093221 
 
% Explained 
Variance 29 10 9 9 5 5 4 4 
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